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I. INTRODUCTION
Opponents of the death penalty have long taken the United
States Supreme Court to task for not ruling that the penalty is per
se unconstitutional. But there also has been a longstanding breed of
less absolutist critics. These critics are willing to assume arguendo
that regulation rather than abolition is a proper stance for the
Court. They then argue that the Court’s chosen means of regulation
have proven ineffective to remedy the very evils that prompted the
Court to undertake regulation of capital punishment in the first
place. The most complete and high-profile presentation of this critique occurs in a provocative article in a recent issue of the Harvard
Law Review.1 There, Professors Carol S. and Jordan M. Steiker seek
to perform an “internal” critique2 of Supreme Court death penalty
jurisprudence: an examination of whether the Court has achieved
the goals that it has set for itself since it began to regulate state
death penalty law more than two decades ago. 3 After exhaustive and
thoughtful analysis, the authors come to a damning conclusion:
“[T]he Supreme Court’s chosen path of constitutional regulation of
the death penalty has been a disaster, an enormous regulatory effort
with almost no rationalizing effect.”4 If Steiker and Steiker are correct, they have succeeded in exposing the fact that the Court’s
regulatory effort is the juridical equivalent of the Emperor’s new
clothes—costly, yet embarrassingly ineffective for the goals Steiker
and Steiker attribute to the Court: decreasing “overinclusion”—the
imposition of death sentences on defendants who are not among the
“worst” murderers; decreasing “underinclusion”—the imposition of
death sentences on only some, rather than all, equally culpable
murderers; and increasing “individualization” of sentencing by con1. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355 (1995).
The Steiker article has been cited in the popular press. See Ted Gest, A House Without a
Blueprint: After 20 Years, the Death Penalty Is Still Being Meted Out Unevenly, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP., July 8, 1996, at 41 (quoting Steiker and Steiker for the proposition that
Supreme Court death penalty jurisprudence has “grown like a house without a blueprint—
with a new room here, a staircase there, but without the guidance of a master builder”).
See also RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA at xv (1991) (“[A] substantial number of death sentences continue to be imposed in a fashion that can only be
described as ‘freakish.’ ”); Daniel Givelber, The New Law of Murder, 69 IND. L.J. 375, 378
(1994) (“The new law [of capital] murder is a failure. By most measures, it has marginally
reduced but by no means eliminated arbitrariness from capital punishment.”).
2. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 1, at 364.
3. See id.
4. Id. at 426.
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sidering all aspects of the defendant’s character; all through
“heightened procedural reliability.”5
My purpose is to dispute the arguments of the less absolutist
critics represented by Steiker and Steiker. I will do this by responding to Steiker and Steiker’s piece, which I deem to be the “state of
the art” for this type of critique. I will argue that despite the virtues
of their article,6 Steiker and Steiker are wrong in two important ways.
First, they, along with other critics I will call “academic underinclusionists,” have wrongly concluded that minimizing all underinclusion has been one of the Court’s concerns. This incorrect conclusion regarding underinclusion is exacerbated by Steiker and
Steiker’s view that the Court’s three alleged substantive concerns—
overinclusion, underinclusion, and individualization—are of equal
weight.7 I will argue, rather, that there are three causes of underinclusion: (1) “merits-based”—the case is underincluded because reasonable minds can differ with respect to whether it is one of the
“worst” homicides; (2) “mundane”—the case is underincluded because of everyday concerns that apply to capital and noncapital
cases alike, such as loss of a key witness, case overload leading to
plea bargaining, etc.; and (3) “invidious”—the case is underincluded
because of illegitimate racial or class bias. I believe that the Court 8
has viewed merits-based underinclusion as a desirable phenomenon:
it has often prohibited states from using mechanisms that would
curtail such underinclusion. As to mundane underinclusion, I be5. Id. at 364.
6. The article is particularly effective in showing how easily states can fulfill the requirements the Court has set, see id. at 402, and at illuminating roads not taken by the
Court that might have had better results, see id. at 414-26.
7. Steiker and Steiker never suggest that any of these goals are viewed by the Court
as more important than any other, and in fact may suggest at one point that minimizing
underinclusion is in fact the Court’s primary goal: “Each of the three concerns or commitments (desert, fairness, and individualization) reflects different facets of the basic norm of
equal treatment, the idea that like cases should be treated alike.” Id. at 369.
8. In this context, as in most others, it is dangerous to view “the Court” as an entity
with a single mind, when in fact it is composed of nine members who often have diametrically opposed opinions. As to the death penalty, as Steiker and Steiker point out, “the basic
configuration on Eighth Amendment issues remained constant for two decades after Furman: two unwavering poles competed for the center.” Id. at 428 (citing Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972)). On one pole were former Justices Brennan and Marshall, who advocated complete abolition of the death penalty. See id. at 427. On the other pole were former
Chief Justice Burger and current Chief Justice Rehnquist (joined in more recent days by
Justices Scalia and Thomas), who oppose significant regulation of the death penalty
through the Eighth Amendment. See id. It was thus the remaining “centrist” justices like
Blackmun (until late in his career, when he became a virtual abolitionist), O’Connor,
Powell, Stevens, and White, whose votes controlled the outcomes of cases. See id. at 428.
Thus, when I refer to “the Court,” I am referring to that centrist bloc as augmented by
whatever votes they could pull from the two poles on particular issues. Despite the cobbled-together nature of this body of doctrine, Steiker and Steiker acknowledge that the
Court has promulgated some consistent themes, see id. at 364, and I agree (although I do
not agree with Steiker and Steiker concerning what all those themes are).
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lieve the Court has recognized that it is beyond the Court’s power to
regulate, short of complete abolition of the death penalty, a step the
Court has never been willing to take. That leaves invidious underinclusion, the only form of underinclusion about which the Court has
been concerned. The academic underinclusionists’ mistake regarding
the Court’s alleged across-the-board concern with underinclusion is
a serious one because underinclusion is a far more prevalent feature
of capital punishment than is overinclusion. Thus, if these critics are
wrong about the Court’s concern with underinclusion, it throws their
entire argument into serious doubt.
The correct view, I will contend, is that the Court has had only
one primary goal for its regulation of capital punishment: decreasing
overinclusion, with particular interest in minimizing invidious
overinclusion due to racial bias. I will argue that the Court’s regulatory efforts have prompted responses from the states that, at least
on their faces, seem to have the potential to partially achieve the
Court’s goal.
The question then becomes, of course, whether these state responses have actually succeeded in producing such improved results.
I will contend that the second way in which I believe Steiker and
Steiker have erred is by not substantiating their claim that the
Court has legitimated state death penalty systems having the same
potential to operate arbitrarily as the pre-Furman v. Georgia 9 systems. Beyond that, I will argue that they have not proven that postFurman systems are in fact systematically operating in as arbitrary
a fashion, even accepting Steiker and Steiker’s assertion that the
Court is opposed to all underinclusion. In fact, the best available
evidence strongly suggests that post-Furman systems are operating
less arbitrarily with respect to both overinclusion and underinclusion,10 and that this improvement is likely due in significant part to
the Court’s regulatory efforts.11
Before I begin my task, though, a bit of a disclaimer is in order.
The analysis that Steiker and Steiker perform, and that I will undertake in response, is of a very traditional scholarly sort—trying to
figure out what a body of legal doctrine says, what the policy goals
behind it are, and whether it seems to be fulfilling those goals. The
same type of analysis could be applied to a body of contract, tort, or
property law. But the death penalty seems different to many people:
it evokes such intense emotions in some opponents that scholarly
analysis seems beside the point. Lest those opponents take me as an

9. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (abolishing then-existing state death penalty
laws).
10. See infra Part III.B.1-2.
11. See infra Part III.C.
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apologist for the death penalty, let me state my position for the record: I do not believe the death penalty should exist. Nor do I want to
be understood as arguing that the Court has done an excellent job in
choosing and implementing the goals it is seeking to foster through its
death penalty jurisprudence. I do insist, though, that the topic is fair
game for traditional, dispassionate legal analysis, that such analysis
in this instance turns out to be quite illuminating, and that when the
analysis cuts in the Court’s favor, one must call it as one sees it.
II. STEIKER AND STEIKER’S MISTAKE REGARDING UNDERINCLUSION
A. Steiker and Steiker’s Argument
Steiker and Steiker explain their mission as follows:
We thus have chosen to read Furman and Gregg [v. Georgia,
Proffitt v. Florida, Jurek v. Texas, Woodson v. North Carolina , and
Roberts v. Louisiana] together as a way of identifying the Supreme
Court’s concerns and goals regarding its constitutional regulation
of capital punishment. We stop with Gregg and its companion
cases, however, because the seeds of all of the rest of the Court’s
capital jurisprudence can be traced to the themes that it sounded
in 1972 and 1976. . . . [I]t seems likely that the Court itself would
think it fair to measure the success of its capital punishment jurisprudence against the concerns articulated in Furman and Gregg et
al. Given that our critique of the Court is an internal one, identifying these concerns becomes a crucial part of our project.12

As the authors themselves recognize, it is crucial to their enterprise
to correctly identify the concerns that the Court would itself choose
to analyze its performance. Here, then, are the concerns Steiker and
Steiker identify: “We think that these concerns can fairly be grouped
around four ideas: desert (the problem of overinclusion), fairness
(the problem of underinclusion), individualization, and heightened
procedural reliability.”13 The authors describe each of these concerns
more fully. Overinclusion is “the application of the death penalty in
circumstances in which, notwithstanding the sentencer’s decision,
the sentence is not deserved according to wider community standards,”14 because the defendant is not among the “worst” offenders. 15
Underinclusion is the “failure to treat equally deserving cases
alike,”16 which is unacceptably unfair when the system “treat[s] oth12. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 1, at 364 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976)).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 372.
15. See id.
16. Id. at 366.
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ers, just as ‘deserving’ as the condemned defendant, more leniently
for no reason, or for invidious reasons.” 17 Individualization refers to
the idea that determination of the “worst” crimes requires inquiry
not only into facts regarding the offense, but also facts regarding the
offender that might be cause for judging the offender to not be
among the “worst.”18 Heightened procedural reliability is the means
to these other three ends: “[R]eliability is tied to strong notions of
desert and fairness among defendants. Hence, one can view the
Court’s commitment to heightened procedural reliability as its manner of making good on its three substantive commitments—to desert,
fairness, and individualization in capital sentencing.” 19
Having identified these concerns, Steiker and Steiker go on to
demonstrate how, in their view, the Court’s jurisprudence has failed
to result in improved capital punishment systems that assuage any
of the four concerns. As to overinclusion, Steiker and Steiker claim
that the Court has failed to require states to narrow significantly the
class of death-eligible defendants,20 and has not itself placed any important limitations on death-eligibility21 (other than the ban on the
death penalty for rape in Coker v. Georgia 22). As to underinclusion,
the authors argue that the Court has failed to require the sentencer’s decision to be “channeled”23 at the “critical moment when it
decide[s] whether to impose a death sentence.” 24 This leaves standardless discretion in the sentencer, which inevitably leads to like
cases being treated differently.25 The authors also are critical of the
Court’s approach to achieving its goal of individualization. 26 Although the Court has certainly opened the door to all individualizing
mitigating evidence, it also has concomitantly permitted arbitrariness into the process by the very same means. 27 Nor has the Court
required states to channel the sentencer’s consideration of individualizing evidence.28 Finally, as to heightened procedural reliability, the Court has failed, according to Steiker and Steiker, to go as
far as it should in requiring states to treat death differently procedurally. The Court has imposed some special protections, 29 but “it
17. Id.
18. See id. at 369.
19. Id. at 371 (emphasis added).
20. See id. at 373-75.
21. See id. at 375-78.
22. See id. at 375-76 (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977)).
23. Id. at 378-82.
24. See id. at 381.
25. See id. at 380-82.
26. See id. at 389-96.
27. See id. at 390-92.
28. See id. at 393-95.
29. See id. at 397 (citing Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 37 (1986) (permitting voir
dire concerning racial prejudice in cases involving interracial murders); Gardner v. Flor-
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has done so in an entirely ad hoc fashion and left untouched a substantial body of doctrine that relegates capital defendants to the
same level of protection as noncapital defendants.” 30 Thus, Steiker
and Steiker contend that the Court’s capital jurisprudence has been
an ineffective disaster.31 However, I believe Steiker and Steiker have
erred in their identification of the Court’s alleged concern with underinclusion, which substantially undermines the subsequent critique.
B. Underinclusion Depicted
Steiker and Steiker are certainly operating on the basis of received wisdom when they contend that the Court is concerned with
the problem of underinclusion. Several other academic underinclusionists have concluded that the Court views underinclusion as a
vice.32 The most well-known are Professors David Baldus, George
Woodworth, and Charles Pulaski (hereinafter “BWP”), who refer to
the same problem as that of “excessiveness,”33 or, even more de-

ida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-62 (1977) (invalidating a death sentence based in part upon a presentence report not made available to defense counsel); Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S.
320, 328-30 (1985) (preventing prosecutors from arguing that the jury’s decision is not the
final one concerning the death sentence since the jury verdict is subject to appellate review); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38 (1980) (requiring the inclusion of lesserincluded offense instructions that would support a guilty verdict for a noncapital offense);
Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 163-64 (1994) (permitting defendant to inform
jury that a “life” sentence means life without parole); Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578,
584-87 (1988) (overturning a sentence based upon a prior conviction later invalidated);
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993) (post-trial judicial consideration of newly discovered evidence may be constitutionally required in a truly compelling case)).
30. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 1, at 397.
31. See id. (“It is difficult to imagine a body of doctrine that is much worse—either in
its costs of implementation or in its negligible returns—than the one we have now.”);id. at
429 (describing the doctrinal structure as “functionally and aesthetically unsatisfying”);id.
at 437 (describing the Court’s doctrine as “failure as regulation”); id. at 438 (“We are left
with the worst of all possible worlds: the Supreme Court’s detailed attention to death
penalty law has generated negligible improvements over the pre-Furman era, but has
helped people to accept without second thoughts—much less ‘sober’ ones—our profoundly
failed system of capital punishment.”).
32. See, e.g., David C. Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experiment, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661, 664 (1983)
(“[I]ndividual death sentences that are excessively severe in comparison to the sentences
imposed in factually indistinguishable cases—what we call ‘comparatively excessive’—do
violate the [E]ighth [A]mendment.”); Arnold Barnett, Some Distribution Patterns for the
Georgia Death Sentence, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1327, 1328 (1985) (“The notion animating
proportionality review—one that has been explicitly endorsed by the Supreme Court—is
that death sentences cannot be imposed in an arbitrary manner. It is considered objectionable if a given defendant is put to death while, in adjacent counties (or adjacent courtrooms), defendants in virtually the same situation are given prison terms.”); PATERNOSTER,
supra note 1, at 162-64 (arguing that Furman and Gregg both show that the Court has
been concerned with underinclusion).
33. DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 14 (1990).
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scriptively, “comparative excessiveness.”34 BWP performed thorough
and influential research on a body of several hundred pre- and postFurman cases to study the extent of the underinclusion problem in
Georgia.35 It is crucial to understand what academic underinclusionists mean when they refer to underinclusion, particularly as it differs from overinclusion. While I will discuss the BWP statistical
work later,36 the easiest visual aid to use in understanding the issue
is one created by Professor Arnold Barnett about a decade ago. 37
Professor Barnett examined Georgia murder convictions 38 between March 28, 1973, and June 30, 1978, 39 and analyzed the variables that appeared to him to account for whether or not death sentences were imposed.40 He concluded that the likelihood of a death
sentence depended upon how the case scored on each of three variables: certainty that the killing was deliberate; relationship between
defendant and victim; and vileness of killing (which involved two
sub-inquiries: whether there was a plausible claim of self-defense,
and whether the killing was particularly horrific in any of fourteen
specified ways).41 He developed a protocol for each of the three variables that permitted him to assign a score of 0, 1, or 2 as to the first
and third variables, and 0 or 1 as to the second (0 having little or no
tendency to lead to a death sentence, 1 having a moderate tendency,
and 2 having a strong tendency—thus, the best (least death-prone)
score a case could get was 0, 0, 0, and the worst (most death-prone)
score a case could get was 2, 1, 2).42 He then analyzed what proportion of defendants in cases having identical scores received the death
sentence.43 His chart is reproduced in Figure 1, 44 although I have

34. Id.
35. The two written works in which BWP set forth the findings that are most pertinent for purposes of this Article are BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 33, and
Baldus et al., Comparative Review, supra note 32.
36. See infra Parts III.B.1.a, III.B.2.
37. See Barnett, supra note 32, at 1342. The BWP group used complicated regression
analysis. As will shortly be apparent, Barnett’s methodology involves assigning simple integer values. See infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
38. See Barnett, supra note 32, at 1329. In Georgia, there is only one degree of murder. See GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1101(a) (Supp. 1996).
39. See Barnett, supra note 32, at 1335. This is the same group of post-Furman cases
analyzed by BWP. See BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 33, at 94.
40. See Barnett, supra note 32, at 1329.
41. See id. at 1339-41, 1364-66. Barnett’s method may seem overly simplistic in focusing on only three variables, but the accuracy of his selection of factors is not crucial because choosing other factors would result in the same sort of continuum with low death
sentencing rates for the least culpable cases, midrange death sentencing rates for midrange cases, and high death sentencing rates for the most culpable offenders. See, e.g., infra notes 177-81 and accompanying text (explaining system developed by BWP).
42. See Barnett, supra note 32, at 1341. Barnett’s protocols for each of the three variables are reproduced at the end of this Article. See infra Appendix A.
43. See Barnett, supra note 32, at 1342.
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FIGURE 1
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added letters to each box for easy reference. The score of each case
on Barnett’s three variables is in parentheses on the bottom line of
each box. The first number on the top line is the proportion of cases
in that box in which the defendant was sentenced to death. Next to
the proportion, in parentheses, is the fraction on which the proportion is based—the numerator is the number of defendants in that
category who received the death sentence, and the denominator is
the number of cases in that category. For example, in box K, there
were fifty-nine defendants whose cases scored 1, 1, 1, and fifteen of
them received the death sentence, a proportion of .25.
There are three important things to note about Barnett’s diagram. First, it generally reflects a common-sense continuum, from a
nonexistent or very low death sentencing rate in the lower-scored
cases (boxes A-J), through a significant but not preponderant rate in
moderate-scored cases (boxes K-M), to a preponderant rate in highscored cases (boxes N-P). The second thing to note is how well the
diagram illustrates the clear cases of overinclusion: unless Barnett’s

44. Barnett’s chart is found at Barnett, supra note 32, at 1342. Actually, the chart I
have reproduced here is a reformulation of Barnett’s chart produced by BWP in BALDUS ET
AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 33, at 95. I chose to use the Baldus reformulation because
it is slightly easier to understand. There are a couple of minor discrepancies between the
two charts for which I cannot account, but they do not make any difference in the analysis.
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analysis failed to pick up on some key aggravating aspect of the
cases—always a possibility when using a factors-type analysis—the
imposition of the death sentence on one defendant in each of boxes
C, E, G, H, and J seems clearly to be arbitrary in that it is unlikely
that those defendants were among the worst murderers in Georgia
during that time span. For those defendants, Justice Stewart’s famous aphorism that “[t]hese death sentences are cruel and unusual
in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual”45 seems apt.
The third important thing to note about Barnett’s diagram is how
prevalent underinclusion is compared with overinclusion. I draw the
dividing line separating overinclusion and underinclusion between
boxes J and K. In all the boxes A-J, the death sentencing rate is below ten percent, while in all the boxes K-P, the death sentencing
rate is at least twenty-five percent. To me, this indicates that the
death-sentenced defendants in boxes K-P were not overincluded—
their crimes were of a nature that evoked death sentences with
regularity. If my dividing line is right, then there are 109 instances
of underinclusion in boxes K-P, compared with only five cases of
overinclusion in boxes A-J. This means that underinclusion is a
much more prevalent aspect of the system than is overinclusion.
Academic underinclusionists do not demand perfect evenhandedness of the system. BWP set the threshold for evenhanded sentencing as above .80, i.e., in over eighty percent of similar cases, the sentence was death.46 Thus, they are willing to accept the evenhandedness of the death sentences in cases in boxes P (.86 ratio) and N (.81
ratio). The true underinclusion problem, according to academic underinclusionists, inheres in boxes K-M and O, where there is both a
significant death sentencing rate and a significant number of defendants who are spared the ultimate sanction. 47 The diagram thus well
illustrates the core concern of the academic underinclusionists
(including Steiker and Steiker)—a concern that they believe the
Court shares. And, admittedly, academic underinclusionists do have
significant language from the Court’s opinions on which to rely.
C. The Court’s Pronouncements on Which Aca demic
Underinclusionists Rely
Academic underinclusionists rely upon a series of Supreme Court
pronouncements as the basis for their argument that the Court has

45. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
46. See BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 33, at 60.
47. See id. at 94-95 (discussing Barnett’s work and identifying what would be underinclusive under his system).
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been concerned with underinclusion. 48 These pronouncements begin
in three of the concurring opinions in Furman. In one, Justice
Douglas opined:
The high service rendered by the “cruel and unusual” punishment
clause of the Eighth Amendment is to require legislatures to write
penal laws that are evenhanded, nonselective, and nonarbitrary,
and to require judges to see to it that general laws are not applied
sparsely, selectively, and spottily to unpopular groups.49

Justice Stewart stated, “For, of all the people convicted of rapes and
murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as reprehensible as these, the
petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful upon
whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed.” 50 And Justice
White argued:
But when imposition of the penalty reaches a certain degree of infrequency, it would be very doubtful that any existing general need
for retribution would be measurably satisfied. Nor could it be said
with confidence that society’s need for a specific deterrence justifies death for so few when for so many in like circumstances life
imprisonment or shorter prison terms are judged sufficient . . . .51

The Court reiterated these sentiments in upholding new death
penalty regimes four years later. In Jurek v. Texas,52 the Court noted
that “Texas has provided a means to promote the evenhanded, rational, and consistent imposition of death sentences under law.” 53 In
Proffitt v. Florida,54 the Court approved judge rather than jury sentencing by noting:
[I]t would appear that judicial sentencing should lead, if anything,
to even greater consistency in the imposition at the trial court
level of capital punishment, since a trial judge is more experienced
in sentencing than a jury, and therefore is better able to impose
sentences similar to those imposed in analogous cases.55

And, in Gregg v. Georgia,56 the Court cited favorably to the White
and Stewart opinions in Furman.57

48. See Baldus et al., Comparative Review, supra note 32, at 696-97 (citing language
of cases quoted infra text accompanying notes 49-55); see also Steiker & Steiker, supra
note 1, at 367-68 & nn.44-55 (citing several of those same cases).
49. Furman, 408 U.S. at 256 (Douglas, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
51. Id. at 311-12 (White, J., concurring).
52. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
53. Id. at 276.
54. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
55. Id. at 252.
56. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
57. See id. at 188.
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Similar sentiments appear in later opinions. In Godfrey v. Georgia,58 the Court found the aggravating circumstance of an
“outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman” offense unconstitutionally vague, stating, “There is no principled way to distinguish this case, in which the death penalty was imposed, from the
many cases in which it was not.”59 In Gardner v. Florida ,60 the Court
stated the general principle that “the State must administer its capital-sentencing procedures with an even hand . . . .” 61 And in Zant v.
Stephens,62 the Court noted that the findings that the defendant had
escaped from custody and had a prior conviction for a capital felony
“adequately differentiate this case in an objective, evenhanded, and
substantively rational way from the many Georgia murder cases in
which the death penalty may not be imposed.” 63 Reading these
statements, one would have to agree with the academic underinclusionists’ conclusion that the Court is concerned with underinclusion.
Nevertheless, to really understand what the Court is getting at by
these statements, one must recognize that there are three different
reasons for underinclusion, and that the Court views the validity of
these reasons in quite different ways.
D. The Causes of Underinclusion
Steiker and Steiker suggest that there are only two possible reasons for the “failure to treat equally deserving cases alike”: 64 “for no
reason, or for invidious reasons.”65 Obviously, both of these are illegitimate reasons—no rational person wants to see a defendant sentenced to death because of the result of a coin toss, or because of racial or class bias. However, the landscape of underinclusion has
more features than these two, as will be apparent by examining a
set of Georgia cases that have been studied extensively.
During the five-year period covered by Barnett’s study, there
were about 2,000 defendants in Georgia who were convicted of murder or voluntary manslaughter.66 Of these, 594 defendants received
either life or death sentences after jury trials, or were sentenced to
death after pleading guilty to murder.67 These 594 formed the basis
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

446 U.S. 420 (1980).
Id. at 432.
430 U.S. 349 (1977).
Id. at 361.
462 U.S. 862 (1983).
Id. at 879.
Steiker & Steiker, supra note 1, at 366.
Id.
There were 2,484 such convictions in the six-year period following Furman. See
BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 33, at 45. This means there likely were about
2,000 in the five-year period included in Barnett’s study.
67. See Baldus et al., Comparative Review, supra note 32, at 680.
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for Barnett’s analysis.68 In 194 of those cases, there was a single
death penalty trial, and in twelve additional cases, there were two
or more penalty trials.69 The upshot is a total of 206 penalty trials
with 112 death sentences imposed.70 The obvious challenge arising
from the data is to explain the factors that resulted in some defendants being sentenced to death, and others not. Barnett and BWP
made herculean efforts to isolate factors about the cases from which
explanations could be inferred. I will now, instead, identify factors
about the system that account for the underinclusion.
Only about thirty percent of homicide cases (594 out of approximately 2,000) resulted in murder convictions. 71 Thus, there was a
seventy percent underinclusion rate “off-the-top” as to whether the
death sentence would be sought. This underinclusion must be due in
part to what I will call “prosecutorial charging underinclusion”—the
prosecutor chose not to seek a murder conviction. The reasons for
prosecutorial underinclusion can conceptually be divided into three
categories: (1) merits-based—the prosecutor did not personally believe that the case warranted a murder conviction, and/or the
prosecutor did not believe the jury could be convinced to return a
murder verdict; (2) mundane—which includes a whole host of variables that are endemic to a prosecutor’s job, e.g., a key witness disappeared or changed stories, the prosecutor had a case overload and
needed to plea bargain, the prosecutor had to offer a deal to one codefendant to obtain testimony against another, etc.; and (3) invidious—the prosecutor’s decision not to seek a murder conviction was
based on illegitimate discriminatory motives, most likely racial or
class bias.
The seventy percent off-the-top underinclusion rate also must be
in part a result of what I will call “guilt-determiner underinclusion”—the prosecutor sought a murder conviction, but the trier of
fact (usually a jury) returned a manslaughter verdict. This underinclusion can be divided into two categories: (1) merits-based—the
trier of fact felt that the facts warranted the lesser conviction; and
(2) invidious—the trier of fact reduced the level of the conviction for
illegitimate discriminatory motives.
Of the 594 cases that resulted in murder convictions, prosecutors
sought death sentences in only about one-third of them. 72 Of the 400
instances in which the death penalty was not sought, 123 can be
explained by the fact that the defendant was not death-eligible be68. See Barnett, supra note 32, at 1338.
69. See BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 33, at 44.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 43-45.
72. See id. at 44 (the penalty was sought in about 200 instances, versus about 400 instances in which it was not). For the exact figures, see supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
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cause there was no statutory aggravating factor present. 73 This
leaves about 270 cases of what I will call “prosecutorial sentencing
underinclusion.” Again, the universe of possible causes of prosecutorial underinclusion can be divided into three categories: meritsbased, mundane, and invidious. Merits-based underinclusion in sentencing means that the prosecutor personally did not believe the
case warranted a death sentence, and/or did not believe the sentencer would return a death sentence. “Mundane” in this context refers to non-merits-based, noninvidious causes, such as that the
county could not afford to prosecute a death penalty case, 74 the victim’s family was opposed to imposition of a death sentence, the
prosecutor agreed to give a convicted co-defendant a deal to obtain
penalty phase testimony against another co-defendant, etc.
“Invidious” refers again to decisions based on illegitimate motives,
such as racial and class bias.
The data also show that the sentencers (presumably usually a
jury, although a defendant can waive jury sentencing and opt to be
sentenced by the judge)75 declined to impose death sentences in
ninety instances out of 203, a “sentencer underinclusion” rate of
about forty-five percent. This underinclusion can theoretically be
divided into the same two categories as guilt-determiner underinclusion: merits-based—the sentencer felt that the case did not warrant a death sentence, and invidious—the sentencer declined to impose a death sentence for illegitimate motives. The diagram in Figure 2 may help to summarize the flow of underinclusion. This diagram describes a richer and more true-to-life understanding of underinclusion than is presented by Steiker and Steiker. The richer
understanding of underinclusion has important implications for understanding the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence. A necessary
prelude to examining that jurisprudence, though, is a paean to the
virtues of merit-based underinclusion.

73. See BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 33, at 88-89 (of the 606 murder
convictions studied, 483 were death-eligible).
74. Death penalty cases, if properly defended, cost a great deal more than other murder cases at virtually every stage, from voir dire through sentencing. Since most deatheligible defendants are indigent, the court ends up footing litigation costs for both sides.
For horror stories of capital defendants who got bargain-basement representation, see Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for
the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994).
75. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30.1 (Supp. 1996) (permitting sentencing by a judge
presumably if jury is waived, although the statute is not entirely clear on that point).
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E. The Legitimacy of Merits-Based Underinclusion
1. Merits-Based Underinclusion at the Guilt Phase
Our system is designed to be merits-based underinclusive at the
guilt/innocence stage. The old adage that it is better for ten guilty
persons to go free than for one innocent person to be convicted 76 is
premised on the belief that being convicted of a crime is qualitatively

76. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358.
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FIGURE 2
UNDERINCLUSION DIAGRAM

Manslaughter
Convictions
+ 1400

Illegal Homicides
+ 2000

Possible reasons not murder:
1. Prosecutorial charging underinclusion
A. Merits-based
B. Mundane
C. Invidious
2. Guilt-determiner underinclusion
A. Merits-based
B. Invidious

Murder Convictions
+ 600

Death
Sentence
Sought
+ 200

Death
Sentence
Imposed
+ 100

Death
Sentence
Not Imposed
+ 90
Possible reasons
death sentence not
imposed:
Sentencer
underinclusion
A. Merits-based
B. Invidious

Death
Sentence
Not Sought
+ 400

Not
Death-Eligible
+ 123

Death-Eligible
+ 270

Possible reasons death
sentence not sought:
Prosecutorial sentencing
underinclusion
A. Merits-based
B. Mundane
C. Invidious

1997]

DEATH PENALTY GOALS

561

different and more drastic than any other action the government can
take against an individual.77 When the individual’s stake is so high,
the risk of error should fall on the side of underinclusion by a fairly
large margin.78 This underinclusion sentiment is reflected in the
criminal justice system by two primary devices, which I will refer to
as “traditional underinclusion mechanisms”: the requirement of
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the requirement of a
supermajority vote of the jury for conviction (unanimity in most jurisdictions). The Court has held that both of these traditional underinclusion mechanisms are mandated by the Constitution, 79 which
means they must reflect a laudable policy goal. Thus, at the
guilt/innocence stage, merits-based underinclusion is indisputably a
virtue, not a vice.
2. Transferring the Underinclusion Urge to the Death Sentencing
Stage
The virtue of merits-based underinclusion at the sentencing stage
in general is a less straightforward proposition. Where the system is,
by definition, not dealing with innocent persons, there are undeniable benefits to consistency in terms of actual fairness, the appearance of fairness, and general deterrence. Equally undeniably, however, there should always be a place for individualization in the sentencing process, as even quite rigid sentencing guidelines recog-

77. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (“The accused during a criminal
prosecution has at stake interest of immense importance, both because of the possibility
that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be
stigmatized by the conviction.”).
78. See id. at 371-72 (Harlan, J., concurring).
In a civil suit between two private parties for money damages, for example,
we view it as no more serious in general for there to be an erroneous verdict in
the defendant’s favor than for there to be an erroneous verdict in the plaintiff’s
favor . . . . In a criminal case, on the other hand, we do not view the social
disutility of convicting an innocent man as equivalent to the disutility of acquitting someone who is guilty . . . . I view the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than
to let a guilty man go free.
Id.
79. The Court found the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof to be constitutionally required in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). As to the supermajority requirement, the Constitution requires unanimity for conviction by a six-person jury. See
Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 138 (1979). As to a twelve-person jury, the Court has
upheld a nine-to-three verdict in favor of conviction. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S.
356, 362-63 (1972). However, the Court probably would not approve any lesser supermajority. Johnson was a five-to-four decision, and one of the five members of the majority, Justice Blackmun, stated in his concurrence that any lesser number of votes for conviction
would cause him “great difficulty.” Id. at 366 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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nize.80 The clearest underinclusion mechanism at sentencing is
simple mercy81—the defendant may deserve a certain sentence, but
there is nonetheless some reason, perhaps inarticulable, not to give
it to the defendant.
As to capital sentencing, the urge for merits-based underinclusion is strong, and its wellsprings parallel those that animate the
desire for underinclusion at the guilt/innocence stage. The state’s
extinguishing of the defendant’s life seems qualitatively different
and more drastic than any other punishment that can be imposed—
to most of us, death is different.82 When the individual’s stake is so
high, the risk of error should fall on the side of underinclusion.
Thus, it would not be surprising to find that many states have chosen to be merits-based underinclusive as to capital sentencing. Further, it would be quite surprising to find that the Court has been
antipathetic to such underinclusion. Let us examine the statutes,
and then the case law.
3. Merits-Based
Underinclusion
Sentencing Procedures

Through

State

Death-

State death sentencing procedures are chock-full of underinclusion mechanisms. These devices are at their most potent in states
where the jury is the sentencer. Twenty-eight of the thirty-eight
80. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(b) (West Supp. 1996) (providing that a court may depart from the sentencing guidelines due to a “circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the
guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described”).
81. For discussions of mercy as a desirable aspect of criminal sentencing, see JEFFRIE
G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 20 (1988) (“To be merciful is to
treat a person less harshly than, given certain rules, one has a right to treat that person.”); Eric L. Muller, The Virtue of Mercy in Criminal Sentencing, 24 SETON HALL L. REV.
288, 335 (1993):
Mercy . . . is an attitude that the sentencer adopts, during the process of selecting a sentence from within a range of authorized punishments, by imagining both the nature of the criminal episode and the impact of the possible sentences from the defendant’s perspective. Mercy reminds the judge of how things
look from the defense table. Mercy’s role in the sentencing process is therefore a
limiting or restraining one; it provides a check against the risk that the sentencer
will get things wrong by describing the nature of the crime in an imbalanced way
or underestimating the impact of the sentence on the defendant.
See also Paul Whitlock Cobb, Jr., Note, Reviving Mercy in the Structure of Capital Punishment, 99 YALE L.J. 389, 391 (1989) (arguing that mercy is a particular virtue in capital
sentencing). But see California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 542 (1987) (holding that an instruction requiring jurors to ignore “mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion,
prejudice, public opinion or public feeling” was not unconstitutional).
82. Justice Brennan created the “death is different” argument in Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 282 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). Since then, the Court has adopted this
precept in part, although by no means to the extent it could have. See Steiker & Steiker,
supra note 1, at 397 (discussing the relatively limited scope to which the Court has put the
“death is different” doctrine into practice).

1997]

DEATH PENALTY GOALS

563

death penalty states fall into this category.83 In eighteen of those
states, the jury must unanimously find that at least one statutory
aggravating circumstance has been proven by the state. 84 If there is
unanimous agreement, the jury then proceeds to consider the aggravating circumstances in comparison to the mitigating circumstances
to determine sentence. At this stage, in all twenty-eight jury sentencing states, the jury must unanimously vote for a death sentence.85 It is important to note that in all but two of the twenty-eight
states,86 a failure to achieve unanimity at either point results in the

83. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-603(c) (Michie 1993); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(k) (West
1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(f) (West Supp. 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(c)
(Supp. 1996); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1 (West Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 214624(e) (1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2) (Michie 1990); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 905.6 (West Supp. 1997); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 413 (g), (h) (Supp. 1996);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(2) (1994); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.030 4 (West Supp. 1997);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5 IV (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(b) (West 1995); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-3 (Michie 1994); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 10 (McKinney Supp.
1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b) (1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(2)
(Anderson 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.11 (West Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT. §
163.150 (Supp. 1994); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c) (West 1982 & Supp. 1996); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-4 (Michie
1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(f) (Supp. 1996); TEX. CRIM. P. CODE ANN. § 37.071 2(e)
(West Supp. 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(4) (Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2264.4 (Michie 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.060 (West 1990); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 62-102(f) (Michie Supp. 1996).
84. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-603(a) (Michie 1993); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(a) (West
1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a (West Supp. 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30
(Supp. 1996); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-103 (1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5 IV (1996);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-3 (Michie 1994); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 7c (McKinney
Supp. 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.11 (West Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT. §
163.150 (Supp. 1994); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c)(iv) (West 1982 & Supp. 1996);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-4
(Michie 1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(f)(1), (2) (Supp. 1996); TEX. CRIM. P. CODE
ANN. § 37.071 2(d)(2), 2(f)(2) (West Supp. 1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(e) (Michie
Supp. 1996).
85. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-603(a) (Michie 1993); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(a) (West
1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a (West Supp. 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30
(Supp. 1996); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(g) (West Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 214624(e) (1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(3) (Michie 1990); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 905.3 (West Supp. 1997); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 413(g)-(i) (Supp. 1996);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(2), (3) (1994); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.030 4 (West Supp. 1997);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5 IV (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(a) (West 1995); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-3 (Michie 1994); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 11(a) (McKinney
Supp. 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b) (1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(1),
(2) (Anderson 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.11 (West Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 163.150(1)(d) (Supp. 1994); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c)(1)(iv) (West 1982 & Supp.
1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A27A-4 (Michie 1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204 (f)(1) (Supp. 1996); TEX. CRIM. P. CODE
ANN. § 37.071 2(c) (West Supp. 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(4) (Supp. 1996); VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4D(1) (Michie 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.060(4) (West
1990); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(d)(ii) (Michie Supp. 1996).
86. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(a) (West 1988); Skaggs v. Commonwealth, 694
S.W.2d 672, 681 (Ky. 1985) (discussing that the failure of a jury to reach a verdict will result in the retrial of the sentencing).
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sentence defaulting to life imprisonment. 87 Thus, unlike a hung jury
at the guilt/innocence phase, which permits a retrial at which the
defendant is again at risk of conviction, in twenty-six states, a hung
jury at the death sentencing proceeding does not permit another
sentencing hearing before another jury where the defendant is again
at risk of receiving a death sentence.
The beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard is almost, but not quite,
as prevalent as the unanimity requirement. Twenty-five states require that at least one aggravating circumstance be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.88 Six states also require that the aggravating circumstances so found outweigh the mitigating circumstances beyond
a reasonable doubt.89 Some states that do not use the beyond-areasonable-doubt standard in the determination of sentence nonetheless use a more moderate underinclusion mechanism by placing
the burden on the state (presumably by a preponderance standard)
to prove that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating.90
87. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-603 (Michie 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(f)
(West Supp. 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-31.1(c) (Supp. 1996); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT ANN.
5/9-1 (West Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4624(e) (1995); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 905.6 (West Supp. 1997); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 413(k)(2) (Supp. 1996); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 99-19-103 (1994); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.030 4 (West Supp. 1997); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 630:5 IV (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(f) (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
31-20A-3 (Michie 1994); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 10 (McKinney Supp. 1997); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b) (1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(2) (Anderson 1996);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.11 (West Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150 (Supp.
1994); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c)(1)(iv) (West 1982 & Supp. 1996); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-3-20(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-4 (Michie 1988);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204 (Supp. 1996); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071 (West
Supp. 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(4) (Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4E
(Michie 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.060 (West 1990); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2102(d)(ii) (Michie Supp. 1996).
88. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-603(a)(1) (Michie 1993); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(a)
(West 1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(c) (Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4624(e)
(1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(3) (Michie 1990); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
905.3 (West Supp. 1997); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 413(d) (Supp. 1996); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 99-19-103 (1994); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.030 1 (West Supp. 1997); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 630:5 III (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3c(2)(a) (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
31-20A-3 (Michie 1994); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 11(a) (McKinney Supp. 1997); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(c)(1) (1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(1) (Anderson 1996);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.11 (West Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150 (Supp.
1994); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c)(iii) (West 1982 & Supp. 1996); S.C. CODE ANN. §
16-3-20(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-5 (Michie 1988); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(f)(1) (Supp. 1996); TEX. CRIM. P. CODE ANN. § 37.071 (West Supp.
1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4C (Michie 1995); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(d)(i)(A)
(Michie Supp. 1996).
89. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-603(a)(2) (Michie 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:112c(3)(a) (West 1995); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 11(a) (McKinney Supp. 1997); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(2) (Anderson 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(f)(2)
(Supp. 1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.060 (West 1990).
90. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(e) (West 1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630.5 III
(1996); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c)(iii) (West 1982 & Supp. 1996).
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Most states employ these traditional underinclusion mechanisms
in combination. The most underinclusive combination, found in
three states, is a unanimity requirement as to the aggravating circumstances, coupled with a requirement that the aggravating circumstances unanimously be found to outweigh the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.91 The most common combination, found in eleven states, is a unanimity requirement as to the
aggravating circumstances that must be found beyond a reasonable
doubt, followed by a requirement that the jury unanimously find for
death after considering the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.92 Other combinations exist.93 The upshot is that every jurysentencing state has opted to employ at least one, and usually more
than one, underinclusion mechanism.
One of the ten non-jury-sentencing states, Nevada, has a unique
system, but one that makes substantial use of the traditional underinclusion mechanisms. There, if the jury cannot unanimously find at
least one aggravating circumstance, or cannot unanimously agree to
a death sentence, the decision passes to a three-judge panel, which
can only impose a death sentence if it unanimously finds at least one
91. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-603(a)(1)-(3) (Michie 1993); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §
400.27 6 (McKinney Supp. 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(f) (Supp. 1996).
92. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4624(e) (1995);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(2) (1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-3 (Michie 1994); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.11 (West Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150 (Supp. 1994); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-3-2 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-5 (Michie
1988); TEX. CRIM. P. CODE ANN. § 37.071 (West Supp. 1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4C
(Michie 1995); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102 (Michie Supp. 1996).
93. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a (West Supp. 1996) (requiring unanimity as to aggravating circumstances, but the burden is only preponderance of evidence). Six
states require a finding of an aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, but do
not specify that the finding must be unanimous. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(3)
(Michie 1990); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.3 (West Supp. 1997); MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. LAW § 413(d), (g), (h), (i) (Supp. 1996); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.030 4 (West Supp.
1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b), (c) (1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4C (Michie
1995). Three states require that an aggravating circumstance be found unanimously beyond a reasonable doubt and that the aggravating circumstances be found to outweigh the
mitigating circumstances. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(k) (West 1988); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 630.5 IV (1995); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c)(iv) (West 1982 & Supp. 1996).
Two states require a finding of an aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt
but do not specify that the finding be unanimous and require that the aggravating circumstances be found to outweigh the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.See
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3c(3) (West 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03 (Anderson
1996). Illinois requires unanimity regarding the existence of an aggravating circumstance.
See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1 (West Supp. 1996). Washington requires a finding
that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.060(4) (West 1990). Only Utah employs
as the sole underinclusion device that the jury’s sentencing recommendations be unanimous (i.e., does not require a finding by the jury of an aggravating circumstance by any
particular burden of proof or number of jurors, and does not require any particular
weighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances). See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3207 (Supp. 1996).
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aggravating circumstance and unanimously agrees to impose a
death sentence.94 Otherwise, the sentence defaults to one of imprisonment.95 Recently, Colorado changed its law to require sentencing
by a three-judge panel with no jury involvement; however, the three
judges must find an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt
and must be unanimous in deciding for death—absent unanimity,
the sentence defaults to imprisonment.96
The remaining eight non-jury-sentencing states give the sentencing decision to the trial judge.97 The unanimity requirement is, of
course, inapplicable to a one-person sentencer. However, some of
these states do employ burden of persuasion underinclusion mechanisms. Two states require the judge to find the existence of the aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. 98 In one of these
states, the judge must find that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. 99
Four states employ a moderate underinclusion mechanism on the
sentence determination question, requiring that the judge must find
that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances (presumably by a preponderance standard). 100 Four states,
though, do not employ any underinclusion mechanism in judge sentencing.101
There is no definitive research examining whether death sentencing underinclusion mechanisms have an actual underinclusive effect, and, if so, how much.102 Yet, common sense suggests that there
is such an effect. In particular, it seems that the requirement for
94. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 175.554-.556 (Michie Supp. 1995).
95. See id. § 175.556(2).
96. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-103 (West Supp. 1996).
97. In four of these states, the jury renders an advisory verdict, but the judge has the
power to override the jury’s recommendation. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(e) (1994); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (1995); FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2) (1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-29(e) (Michie Supp. 1996). In the other four, the judge determines the sentence without any
jury involvement. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703E (West Supp. 1996); IDAHO CODE §
19-2515(c) (Supp. 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-305 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2522
(1995).
98. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d)(1)a (1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(i)(1)
(Michie Supp. 1996).
99. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d)(1)b (1995).
100. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(e) (1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(k) (Michie Supp.
1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2521 (1995).
101. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703E (West Supp 1996); FLA. STAT. § 921.141
(1995); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(c) (Supp. 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-305 (1995). In all
of these states, the mitigating circumstances must outweigh the aggravating circumstances for the defendant to avoid a death sentence.
102. See, e.g., James Luginbuhl & Julie Howe, Discretion in Capital Sentencing Instructions: Guided or Misguided?, 70 IND. L.J. 1161, 1165-76 (1995) (discussing evidence of
juror misapplication of instructions concerning burden of proof regarding aggravating and
mitigating circumstances and unanimity requirement regarding finding of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances). However, jurors can hardly miss the requirement that
their ultimate decision to impose a death sentence must be unanimous.
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unanimity in jury sentencing states should have a powerful underinclusive effect. There is, in fact, some data to support this hunch:
death sentencing rates tend to be lower in jury sentencing states
than in judge-sentencing states.103
Georgia, a jury-sentencing state, employs the most common combination of traditional underinclusion mechanisms. To impose a
death sentence, the jury must unanimously find beyond a reasonable
doubt that at least one aggravating circumstance exists, and then,
after considering the aggravating and mitigating evidence, must
unanimously decide that death is the appropriate sentence. 104 Since
there are three causes of underinclusion—merits-based, invidious,
and mundane—Barnett’s chart105 becomes at once both more problematic and more meaningful. Now, rather than simply labeling the
disparities in boxes K-M and O, where the death sentencing rates
range from .25 to .56, as underinclusive and thus undesirable, we
have to ask what kind(s) of underinclusion is/are at work. If, as I
have argued, underinclusion mechanisms can have merits-based
underinclusive effects, then it seems likely that some of the nondeath sentences in those boxes are underincluded for that reason.
Such underinclusion would result either from a prosecutor exercising merits-based underinclusion in deciding not to seek the death
sentence, or from at least one juror doing so in the sentencing decision. (Indeed, some of the seemingly aberrational non-death sentences in boxes N and P can probably be explained this way as well.)
I am not alone in believing that such underinclusion is legitimate
and desirable: a broad-ranging consensus supports the desirability
of merits-based underinclusion in death sentencing. Many state legislators who support the death penalty have included underinclusion
mechanisms in their states’ death penalty statutes. 106 Further, state
legislators have included these mechanisms voluntarily, as the Su103. See, e.g., BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 33, at 235.
In comparing post-Furman death sentencing rates among the states, it is worth
noting that the states whose statutes require death sentencing by the judge
rather than by the jury tend to have the highest rates in the region (e.g., Indiana in the East North Central region, Florida in the South Atlantic region,
Alabama in the East South Central region, and Arizona and Idaho in the
Mountain region).
Id.; see also Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1036 (1995) (noting that according to statistics compiled by the Alabama Prison Project, there have been only five cases in Alabama
in which the judge rejected an advisory verdict of death and instead imposed life imprisonment, compared to 47 instances where the judge imposed a death sentence over a jury
recommendation of life imprisonment); Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges
and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in
Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759 (1995) (exploring and decrying the propensity of judges
to resort to death sentences in view of increasing public and political pressure).
104. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-10-30, -31.1 (Supp. 1996).
105. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
106. See sources cited supra notes 83-92.
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preme Court has never even hinted that states are required to adopt
such mechanisms.107 On the other side of the debate, death penalty
opponents, who have lost the fight to abolish the death penalty,
would surely, as a fallback position, want to have as many underinclusion mechanisms as possible incorporated in any death penalty
statute. Thus, I believe that it is hardly open to debate that meritsbased underinclusion in death sentencing is a virtue, not a vice.
F. Supreme Court Underinclusiveness Jurisprudence
The Court’s death penalty jurisprudence speaks either directly or
inferentially to all of the causes of underinclusiveness that I have
identified.
1. The Court Has Never Entered the Fray with Respect to
Prosecutorial Underinclusion Due to Mundane Causes.
The Court has not wanted to regulate prosecutorial underinclusiveness resulting from mundane causes, 108 perhaps because it recognizes that it has no effective way—short of declaring the death
penalty unconstitutional per se—to regulate this sort of prosecutorial behavior. The Court’s position is perhaps most apparent in cases
relating to claims of “selective prosecution.” To prevail in either a
capital or noncapital case, a defendant must show discrimination on
some illegitimate basis.109 In effect, this body of doctrine declares
that courts should stay out of the hurly-burly of prosecutorial decision making unless the decisionmaking process is permeated by invidious motives.
107. The Court upheld sentencing by a one-person sentencer when it refused to find
sentencing by the trial judge unconstitutional in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 259-60
(1976). The extent to which the Court might permit a death sentence to be imposed by a
nonunanimous jury has never been tested, because all states with jury sentencing require
a unanimous verdict. The Court has not yet decided whether a unanimous verdict is required at the guilt phase of a case in which the death sentence may be sought upon conviction. See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 630 (1991). The Court also has not required
that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard be employed during capital sentencing, as is
evidenced by the Court’s upholding of state schemes that do not embody that requirement.
See supra notes 82, 85, 92-93 and accompanying text (states not employing the beyond-areasonable-doubt standard in capital sentencing).
108. Examples include witnesses changing stories, co-defendants getting deals, and
prosecutors’ offices being short of resources.
109. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused
committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury generally rests entirely
in his discretion [but the decision to prosecute may not be] . . . “deliberately based
upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.”
Id. (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)).
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2. The Court Has Prohibited States from Curtailing GuiltDeterminers’ Power to Exercise Merits-Based Underinclusion
The Court also has sought to prevent states from curtailing the
power of guilt-determiners to exercise merits-based underinclusion.
The key precedent in this area is Beck v. Alabama,110 in which the
Court found a state law that prohibited lesser-included offense instructions unconstitutional:
[W]hen the evidence unquestionably establishes that the defendant is guilty of a serious, violent offense—but leaves some doubt
with respect to an element that would justify conviction of a capital offense—the failure to give the jury the “third option” of convicting on a lesser included offense would seem inevitably to enhance the risk of an unwarranted conviction.
Such a risk cannot
be tolerated in a case in which the defendant’s life is at stake.111

Giving the guilt-determiner the “third option,” of course, provides
the opportunity to underinclude. Beck establishes the constitutional necessity that the guilt-determiner be provided with that
opportunity.
3. The Court Has Prohibited States from Undermining the
Possibility of Merits-Based Sentencer Underinclusion (and,
Indirectly,
Has
Fostered
Merits-Based
Prosecutorial
Underinclusion)
As with guilt-determiner underinclusion, the Court has actively
sought to prohibit states from curtailing merits-based sentencer underinclusion. This practice is illustrated by five important lines of
authority, starting with the 1968 decision of Witherspoon v. Illinois.112 In Witherspoon, the Court analyzed an Illinois statute permitting the challenge for cause of any venireperson who stated
“conscientious scruples against capital punishment, or that he is opposed to the same.”113 The Illinois Supreme Court had construed the
statute as permitting the prosecution to challenge for cause any venireperson who “might hesitate” to return a death verdict. 114 The

110. 447 U.S. 625 (1980).
111. Id. at 637.
112. 391 U.S. 510 (1968). Although Steiker and Steiker begin their analysis with the
1972 Furman case, see Steiker & Steiker, supra note 1, at 363, I believe the 1968 Witherspoon case is the appropriate starting point for considering the Court’s regulation of states’
administration of the death penalty.
113. 391 U.S. at 512.
114. Id. at 512-23.
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U.S. Supreme Court found the Illinois scheme to be unconstitutional:
[A] jury that must choose between life imprisonment and capital
punishment can do little more—and must do nothing less—than
express the conscience of the community. . . .
If the State had excluded only those prospective jurors who
stated in advance of trial that they would not even consider returning a verdict of death, it could argue that the resulting jury was
simply ‘neutral’ with respect to the penalty. But when it swept
from the jury all who expressed conscientious or religious scruples
against capital punishment and all who opposed it in principle, the
State crossed the line of neutrality. In its quest for a jury capable
of imposing the death penalty, the State produced a jury uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die.115

Witherspoon clearly shows the Court embracing death sentence underinclusion by prohibiting the state from employing a device—
exclusion of death-dubious jurors—that would have tended to
minimize the chances of underinclusion.
The Woodson v. North Carolina 116/Roberts v. Louisiana 117 line of
cases118 prohibiting states from employing a mandatory death penalty for certain categories of murders illustrates the same point. The
effect of a mandatory sentence is to negate the possibility of underinclusion as to any defendant who falls into that category. The
Court’s unwillingness to tolerate such mandatory schemes clearly
illustrates its dislike for devices that would eliminate the possibility
of underinclusion.
The Lockett v. Ohio 119/Eddings v. Oklahoma 120 doctrine requiring
the sentencer to consider all the mitigating evidence offered by the
defendant also undermines Steiker and Steiker’s conclusion that the
Court is not concerned with underinclusion. The purpose of the requirement is to give the sentencer every possible basis to underinclude a particular defendant. A lesser-known case in this line is in-

115. Id. at 519-21.
116. 428 U.S. 280 (1976). Woodson held unconstitutional a statute that made the death
penalty mandatory for every defendant convicted of first-degree murder or felony murder.
See id. at 301.
117. 428 U.S. 325 (1976). Roberts held unconstitutional a Louisiana statute that imposed a mandatory death sentence on five narrowly defined categories of first-degree murder. See id. at 335-36.
118. The Court appeared to reached the logical end of this line in Sumner v. Shuman,
483 U.S. 66, 85 (1987) (holding mandatory death penalty for murder committed by a person serving a life sentence unconstitutional).
119. 438 U.S. 586 (1978). Lockett held unconstitutional an Ohio statute that limited
the categories of mitigating evidence that could be considered by the sentencer. See id. at
608.
120. 455 U.S. 104 (1982). Eddings held that it was unconstitutional for a sentencer to
refuse, as a matter of law, to consider all relevant mitigating evidence. See id. at 112.
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structive. In Mills v. Maryland,121 the jury instructions and verdict
form could have led the jurors to believe that once they found an aggravating circumstance, they had to unanimously find a mitigating
circumstance to return a non-death sentence. 122 The Court found this
unconstitutional—if any one juror found any mitigating circumstance, the juror had to be permitted to balance it against the aggravating circumstance(s).123 Mills shows the Court, once again, taking
a stand against state practices that would have the effect of minimizing the possibility of underinclusion.
In Caldwell v. Mississippi ,124 the prosecutor and the trial court
suggested to the sentencing jury that the ultimate responsibility for
imposition of the death sentence rested not with the jury but with
the appellate court, because the jury’s decision was reviewable. 125
The Court reversed the death sentence:
This Court has always premised its capital punishment decisions
on the assumption that a capital sentencing jury recognizes the
gravity of its task and proceeds with the appropriate awareness of
its “truly awesome responsibility.” In this case the State sought to
minimize the jury’s sense of responsibility for determining the appropriateness of death.126

The jury should be forced to “confront and examine the individuality
of the defendant,”127 including particularly those “compassionate or
mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind.”128 Arising out of this confrontation would be the possibility of
underinclusion—that at least one of the jurors would find something
in the defendant worth sparing.
These four lines of authority, taken together, constitute strong
evidence that the Court has consistently viewed merits-based sentencer underinclusion as a virtue, and has taken steps to prohibit
states from minimizing it. However, it is the fifth line of authority,
embodied in McCleskey v. Kemp ,129 that is the real nail in the coffin
of Steiker and Steiker’s argument that the Court has viewed all underinclusion, whatever its source, as a vice. Steiker and Steiker discuss McCleskey under the fourth of their concerns, heightened procedural regularity.130 However, McCleskey is much more pertinent to
underinclusion because it is the only important case in which the
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

486 U.S. 367 (1988).
See id. at 384.
See id.
472 U.S. 320 (1985).
See id. at 325.
Id. at 341.
Id. at 330.
Id. (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)).
481 U.S. 279 (1987).
See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 1, at 400-01.
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Court has ever been starkly confronted with the opportunity to view
underinclusion as a vice calling for a constitutional remedy.
Although not the most famous portion of the opinion, 131 the Court
did consider whether McCleskey’s death sentence could stand in
view of the fact that others with similar culpability had not been
sentenced to death.132 In essence, the Court considered whether underinclusion rendered the death sentence unconstitutional. The
Court declined to find a constitutional defect: “[A]bsent a showing
that the Georgia capital punishment system operates in an arbitrary
and capricious manner, McCleskey cannot prove a constitutional
violation by demonstrating that other defendants who may be similarly situated did not receive the death penalty.” 133 The Court
deemed that it had rejected McCleskey’s underinclusion contention
way back in Gregg v. Georgia, where it had said:
Nothing in any of our cases suggests that the decision to afford an
individual defendant mercy violates the Constitution. Furman held
only that, in order to minimize the risk that the death penalty
would be imposed on a capriciously selected group of offenders, the
decision to impose it had to be guided by standards so that the sentencing authority would focus on the particularized circumstances
of the crime and the defendant.134

The McCleskey Court concluded its discussion of this point as follows:
Because McCleskey’s sentence was imposed under Georgia sentencing procedures that focus discretion “on the particularized nature of the crime and the particularized characteristics of the individual defendant,” we lawfully may presume that McCleskey’s
death sentence was not “wantonly and freakishly” imposed, and
thus that the sentence is not disproportionate within any reco gnized meaning under the Eighth Amendment .135

A clearer rejection of the notion that the Court believes capital underinclusion, regardless of its source, to be unconstitutional can
hardly be imagined.
These lines of authority not only serve to prohibit states from
minimizing the opportunity for merits-based sentencer underinclusion, but also indirectly foster merits-based underinclusion by prosecutors at both the charging and sentencing stages. Tender-hearted
prosecutors can defend decisions not to seek death sentences by saying, “While the case may have warranted it, I wasn’t completely sure,”
131. The most famous portion of the opinion deals with McCleskey’s claim of invidious
discrimination. For a discussion of this claim and the Court’s treatment of it, see infra
notes 138-141 and accompanying text.
132. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 306-07.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 307 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976)).
135. Id. at 308 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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or, more likely, “I didn’t think the sentencer would go for death, so
why spend all that extra money?” Even hard-nosed prosecutors can’t
ignore fiscal concerns, nor do they like to be perceived as having “lost”
a case where they sought a death sentence, but the sentencer returned
a nondeath verdict. Thus, maintaining the power of the sentencer to
underinclude likely has a “trickle-down” effect on prosecutors.
4. The Court’s Real and Only Underinclusion Concern: Invidious
Underinclusion
We have seen that the Court has not been concerned with prosecutorial underinclusion due to everyday reasons, has sought to preserve the power of guilt-determiners to exercise merits-based underinclusion, and has sought to preserve the power of sentencers to exercise merits-based underinclusion (which likely has a trickle-down
effect on prosecutors’ exercise of merits-based underinclusion). What
is left in the underinclusion grab-bag is, of course, invidious underinclusion at four possible junctures: by prosecutors in charging, by
prosecutors in deciding whether to seek a death sentence, by guiltdeterminers, and by sentencers. Despite the Court’s broad pronouncements that state death penalty systems are required to operate evenhandedly,136 by process of elimination it is clear that invidious underinclusion is the only sort of underinclusion with which the
Court has ever really been concerned.
In understanding the Court’s concern with evenhandedness, it is
important to recognize the racially charged milieu in which members of the Court made their initial comments about the subject back
in Furman. For as many years as they had been on the Court, these
justices had seen a steady stream of death penalty cases from the
South in which (1) African-Americans were seemingly disproportionately represented as defendants; and (2) many of the defendants
had been sentenced to death for rape of white women. 137 In this milieu, it seems quite likely that judicial comments about evenhandedness are in fact coded references to concerns about invidious racial
discrimination against African-American defendants.
Fifteen years after Furman, the McCleskey Court dealt invidious
discrimination claims in capital cases a near-mortal blow. There, the
Court was presented with painstakingly thorough research from a
BWP study showing that, all other things being equal, “a defendant’s odds of receiving a death sentence are increased by a factor of

136. See supra Part II.C.
137. See BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 33, at 140-49 (discussing this racial phenomenon).
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4.3 when the victim is white.”138 The data constituted evidence of either overinclusion (killers of whites who were not among the “worst”
were being sentenced to death on an invidious basis), underinclusion
(killers of blacks who were among the “worst” were not being sentenced to death on an invidious basis when comparable killers of
whites were), or, more likely, both. This was about the most compelling scenario that could have been conceived—short of race-ofdefendant disparities—to induce the Court to condemn a capital
punishment system on the basis of invidious racial discrimination.
Nevertheless, the argument only induced four justices to that conclusion. To the majority, McCleskey’s proof of invidious discrimination simply was not strong enough.139 While this was a great defeat
for death penalty opponents, the Court did in fact adhere to the position that invidious discrimination, if proven, would be unconstitutional.140 The most charitable interpretation of the dubious holding
that the proof was insufficient is that the Court may have been
worried that a contrary conclusion would send the states “back to
the drawing board” to come up with systems having some internal
review mechanism promoting more consistency. This would, of
course, have the concomitant effect of leaving less room for meritsbased underinclusion. Perhaps this concern was in Justice Powell’s
mind when he wrote for the majority:
Discretion in the criminal justice system offers substantial benefits
to the criminal defendant. Not only can a jury decline to impose
the death sentence, it can decline to convict or choose to convict of
a lesser offense. Whereas decisions against a defendant’s interest
may be reversed by the trial judge or on appeal, these discretionary exercises of leniency are final and unreviewable. Similarly, the
capacity of prosecutorial discretion to provide individualized justice is “firmly entrenched in American law.” As we have noted, a
prosecutor can decline to charge, offer a plea bargain, or decline to
seek a death sentence in any particular case. Of course, “the power
to be lenient [also] is the power to discriminate,” but a capital
punishment system that did not allow for discretionary acts of leniency “would be totally alien to our notions of criminal justice.”141

138. David C. Baldus et al., Law and Statistics in Conflict: Reflections on McCleskey v.
Kemp, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 251, 259 (D.K. Kagehiro & W.S. Laufer eds.,
1992).
139. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 298 (“[M]cCleskey would have to prove that the Georgia legislature enacted or maintained the death penalty statute because of an anticipated
racially discriminatory effect.”) (emphasis added).
140. See id.
141. Id. at 311-12 (citations omitted).
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G. The Court’s Primary Concern: Minimizing Overinclusion
I have demonstrated that the Court’s dual concerns with respect
to underinclusion have been to maximize the opportunities for the
merits-based variety, while minimizing the instances of the invidious kind.142 This is consistent with the Court’s primary goal of
minimizing overinclusion. The Court has taken a broad view of
overinclusion, insisting that “worstness” must be determined by
considering not only the facts about the crime, but also any ameliorating facts about the defendant.143 Thus, the Court’s view of overinclusion encompasses Steiker and Steiker’s individualization concern.144 It also encompasses the concern for heightened procedural
reliability145 because there must be some process ensuring the sentencer’s opportunity to hear all the relevant information.
This overinclusion concern has dictated the requirements that
the Court has imposed on the states (which are, as Steiker and
Steiker correctly point out, relatively minimal 146): some specification
of what makes a murder among the “worst;” 147 a virtually unlimited
opportunity for the defendant to introduce mitigating evidence; 148
and a sentencing process that focuses the sentencer’s attention on

142. The Court may have missed the golden opportunity in McCleskey to pay more
than lip service to this goal.
143. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all
but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a
mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.
Id. (emphasis added).
144. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 1, at 369-70.
145. See id. at 370-71.
146. See id. at 402.
[C]ontemporary death penalty law is remarkably undemanding. The narrowing, channeling, and individualization requirements can be simultaneously and
completely satisfied by a statute that defines capital murder as any murder accompanied by some additional, objective factor or factors and that provides for
a sentencing proceeding in which the sentencer is asked simply whether the
defendant should live or die.
Id.
147. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246 (1988).
[T]he narrowing function required for a regime of capital punishment may be
provided in either of these two ways: The legislature may itself narrow the
definition of capital offenses, as Texas and Louisiana have done, so that the
jury finding of guilty responds to this concern, or the legislature may more
broadly define capital offenses and provide for narrowing by jury findings of
aggravating circumstances at the penalty phase.
Id.
148. See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 608 (invalidating a statute that limited the kinds of mitigating evidence the sentencer could consider).
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the seriousness of the decision.149 While the seeds of this regulatory
regime were planted in Furman, and sprouted in Gregg and its companion cases, I think the true shape of the mature plant only became
clear in Lockett, where the Court made it crystal clear that states
could not erect any barrier to the presentation of mitigating evidence.150
To summarize my argument so far, the academic underinclusionists are wrong in identifying one of the Court’s goals as rectifying
states’ “failure to treat equally deserving cases alike” (again, except
for invidious underinclusion). Rather, the Court has tried to preserve
the power of prosecutors and sentencers to underinclude in potential
capital cases. In the following Part, I will argue that not only have
Steiker and Steiker misidentified one of the Court’s goals, but they
also have not proven their claim that the Court’s jurisprudence has
failed to achieve any measurable degree of success as to its chosen
goals. Indeed, the available evidence points in the opposite direction.
III. STEIKER AND STEIKER HAVE NOT PROVEN THAT THE COURT’S
REGULATORY EFFORT HAS BEEN AN INEFFECTIVE DISASTER AND HAVE
IGNORED EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY
Steiker and Steiker’s argument for the ineffectiveness of the
Court’s capital punishment jurisprudence has both a premise and a
conclusion. The premise is that the Court has not imposed significant requirements or prohibitions151 mandating states to create systems having stricter standards than pre-Furman systems,152 but,
through the Lockett/Eddings doctrine, has actually forced states
back toward pre-Furman-like systems.153 This means that while present systems appear to be more nonarbitrarily selective and provide
for more structured and informed decisionmaking, they have virtually the same potential to operate in a systematically arbitrary
fashion.154 I believe this premise is flawed because there are at least
two significant ways that current systems not only appear to provide
149. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 329-30 (1985) (reversing a death sentence because the prosecutor and judge had indicated to the jury that their decision was
not final due to appellate review, thereby possibly detracting from the jury’s awareness
that it was exercising a “truly awesome responsibility”).
150. See 438 U.S. at 605.
151. The only exception is that the Court outlawed the death penalty for rape in Coker
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
152. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 1, at 402 (“[C]ontemporary death penalty law is
remarkably undemanding.”).
153. See id. at 392 (noting the “near completeness” of the return to pre-Furman discretion with respect to mitigating factors).
154. See, e.g., id. at 402 (bemoaning “the fact of minimal regulation, which invites if
not guarantees the same kinds of inequality as the pre-Furman regime”).
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for less arbitrary decision making, but actually do so: the required
statutory narrowing of death-eligibility, and sentencing hearings
that permit the defendant to present mitigating evidence. I will
elaborate on this point in subpart A, below. 155
The conclusion of Steiker and Steiker’s syllogism is that because
the Court’s jurisprudence leaves virtually the same potential for arbitrariness as in pre-Furman systems,156 the jurisprudence has been
“a disaster, an enormous regulatory effort with almost no rationalizing effect.”157 Even assuming, arguendo, that their premise is correct, Steiker and Steiker’s conclusion is flawed. The Steikers’ argument consistently leaps from the could be to the is: because current
state systems, minimally regulated by the Court, invite arbitrary
application,158 the Court’s jurisprudence is an ineffective disaster.159
155. See discussion infra Part III.A.
156. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
157. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 1, at 426.
158. At many points, Steiker and Steiker assert that state systems have the potential
to operate arbitrarily. See, e.g., id. at 375 (“[T]he continuing failure of states to narrow the
class of death-eligible invites the possibility that some defendants will receive the death
penalty in circumstances in which it is not deserved according to wider community standards (overinclusion).”); id. at 378 (“[T]he fear of overinclusive application of the death
penalty that accounted in part for the Court’s decision to enter the constitutional
thicket remains quite justified.”); id. at 381-82 (“Narrowing the class of the deatheligible in no way addresses the problem of [overinclusion], because open-ended discretion after death-eligibility permits, even invites, the jury to act according to its own unaccountable whims.”); id. at 391-92 (“Although such discretion cannot be used to render
a defendant death-eligible contrary to community standards, it can be used to exempt
favored defendants from the death penalty or to withhold severe punishment for crimes
against despised victims.”); id. at 402 (“And the fact of minimal regulation, which invites if not guarantees the same kinds of inequality as the pre-Furman regime, is filtered through time-consuming, expensive proceedings that ultimately do little to satisfy
the concerns that led the Court to take a sober second look at this country’s death penalty practices in the first place.”); id. at 417-18 (“[A]llowing states to seek the death
penalty against all offenders in these categories presents a real and substantial danger
that many offenders will be selected for execution who do not ‘deserve’ it (and who will
therefore be treated more harshly than many offenders who do ‘deserve’ death).”)
(emphasis added).
159. See id. at 426 (“We have argued that the Supreme Court’s chosen path of constitutional regulation of the death penalty has been a disaster, an enormous regulatory effort
with almost no rationalizing effect.”); see also id. at 403 (“In short, the last twenty years
have produced a complicated regulatory apparatus that achieves extremely modest goals
with a maximum amount of political and legal discomfort.”); id. at 426 (“It is difficult to
imagine a body of doctrine that is much worse—either in its costs of implementation or in
its negligible returns—than the one we have now.”); id. at 429 (arguing that the Court’s
death penalty doctrinal structure is “functionally and ethically unsatisfying.”); id. at 437
(“We began our exploration of legitimation theory in an effort to support the idea that the
Court’s deeply flawed death penalty law persists because of its success as a ‘facade’ that
creates an appearance of stringent regulation but hides the incoherence and ineffectiveness of the underlying structure.”); id. at 438 (“We are left with the worst of all possible
worlds: the Supreme Court’s detailed attention to death penalty law has generated negligible improvements over the pre-Furman era, but has helped people to accept without second thoughts—much less ‘sober’ ones—our profoundly failed system of capital punishment.”).
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Steiker and Steiker miss an indispensable logical step: they have to
prove that systems with virtually the same potential to operate in
systematically arbitrary fashions are actually living down to that
potential. The authors do not even attempt such proof, and in fact,
they ignore important evidence to the contrary. I will explain this
point in subpart B, below.160
A. The Flaw in Steiker and Steiker’s Premise
1. The Winnowing Effect of Statutory Narrowing of DeathEligibility
Steiker and Steiker minimize the winnowing effect of aggravating
circumstances in Georgia,161 citing BWP’s work showing that most
post-Furman Georgia murderers are death-eligible because their
cases involve at least one aggravating circumstance. 162 While it is
true that the aggravating circumstance requirement’s winnowing effect is not huge, neither is it de minimis: BWP found that of the 606
jury-trial murder convictions in their post-Furman study, 123 defendants were immune from the death penalty because no aggravating circumstance existed.163 This is an exclusion rate of twenty percent that did not exist pre-Furman.164 Admittedly, these excluded defendants would have been unlikely candidates for death even under
the pre-Furman system. But that also means that they would have
been candidates from which one could expect instances of overinclusion. If, as I have argued, the Court has always been primarily concerned with overinclusion, then the Court should consider it a victory to have forced Georgia to define these defendants out of the
death-eligible pool. In this respect, the post-Furman Georgia system
is demonstrably more nonarbitrarily selective than the pre-Furman
system. While no work equal in scope with BWP’s dated Georgia
study has been done in any other death penalty jurisdiction, there is
no reason to expect that the statutory narrowing of death eligibility
in other death penalty states after Furman did not have the same
beneficial effect on selectivity.165
160. See discussion infra Part III.B.
161. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 1, at 375 (stating that the Baldus study “found
that approximately 86% of all persons convicted of murder in Georgia over a five-year period after the adoption of Georgia’s new statute were death-eligible under that scheme.”).
162. See id. at 375 (citing BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 33, at 268 n.31).
163. See BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 33, at 88-89.
164. The difference between this 20% and the 14% exclusion figure used by Steiker and
Steiker, see supra note 161, is that the 14% figure is based on 1974-79 cases, see BALDUS
ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 33, at 268 n.31, while my 20% figure is based on 197378 cases, see id. at 88-89.
165. See BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 33, at 43 (post-Furman cases analyzed included those from March 28, 1973, through June 20, 1978). In some jurisdictions,
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2. The Effect of Nonperfunctory Sentencing Hearings
Prior to 1970, a death penalty trial in Georgia was unitary,
meaning that the jury deliberated on both guilt and sentence at the
close of the state’s case.166 Under this procedure, there was no opportunity for the sentencer to have the benefit of mitigating information
that might have been developed at a sentencing hearing. In 1970,
two years before Furman, the Georgia Legislature mandated bifurcated proceedings in death penalty cases.167 This required a separate
proceeding to determine sentence after the jury reached a decision
on guilt.168 This was a step forward, but BWP, who examined a
sample of the Georgia death penalty case files for the time between
the institution of the bifurcated proceeding and the time of Furman
had this to say about those sentencing proceedings: “[P]rior to Furman, the sentencing phase of Georgia’s bifurcated procedure was a
perfunctory affair. Normally, the only additional evidence offered
during the sentencing hearing was the defendant’s prior criminal record, if any.”169 BWP also became intimately familiar with hundreds
of prison case files from the five years following Georgia’s death
penalty statute that was eventually upheld in Gregg. Of sentencing
hearings during that time period, BWP had this to say: “After Furman and, perhaps more importantly, after Lockett v. Ohio, which
sensitized attorneys to the significance of mitigating circumstances,
the evidence offered during the sentencing phase of capital cases in
Georgia became much more extensive.”170 Here, then, is another way
in which the difference between the pre- and post-Furman worlds is
not just a chimera—the sentencer in Georgia got significantly more
relevant information in the post-Furman era.171 Again, there is no
cause to believe that Lockett has not had the same effect in other
death penalty states, and because the Court views more information
for the sentencer as a crucial device for minimizing overinclusion,
the Court should be quite pleased with the effects of Lockett.
legislatures have drawn narrow death-eligibility criteria, resulting in a small percentage of
homicides being death eligible. See id. at 233-34 (about 20% of Colorado murder and nonnegligent manslaughter cases death-eligible); see also David Baldus & George Woodworth, Proportionality: The View of the Special Master, 6 CHANCE: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR STATISTICS AND
COMPUTING 9, 11 (1993) (only 227 of over 2,000 New Jersey homicide cases death-eligible).
166. See BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 33, at 25.
167. See id.
168. See id. (explaining the institution of the bifurcated proceeding).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. That is, of course, as long as the defendant’s attorney took advantage of the opportunity to present such evidence. For horror stories concerning attorneys who completely
wasted this opportunity (not necessarily in Georgia), see David J. Gross, Sixth Amendment—Defendant’s Dual Burden in Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 75 J. CRIM.
L. 755, 757 (1984); Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases: The
Evolving Standard of Care, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 323, 325.
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3. Has the Court Succeeded in Minimizing Overinclusion Due to
Race?
The two primary ways in which invidious racial discrimination
can infiltrate the system are via race-of-defendant effects—AfricanAmericans being more likely to be sentenced to death for comparable
crimes—and race-of-victim effects—killers of African-Americans
being less likely to be sentenced to death than those with nonAfrican-American victims. BWP’s 1973-1978 study found that raceof-defendant effects had decreased to the point of being a nonfactor.172 On its face, this finding cuts in favor of the effectiveness of the
Court’s death penalty jurisprudential efforts. However, BWP also
concluded that this decline was not due to the reforms prompted by
Furman.173 Nonetheless, the Court could plausibly declare victory on
this point by invoking the aphorism, “A win is a win.” However, the
statistics in McCleskey suggest that the Court cannot declare victory
regarding race-of-victim effects.174 Thus, the efficacy of the Court’s
jurisprudence regarding its overinclusion subgoal of minimizing invidious underinclusion is highly debatable.
B. The Flaw in Steiker and Steiker’s Conclusion
Despite the demonstrable rationalizing effects of the statutory
narrowing of death eligibility and more complete sentencing hearings, Steiker and Steiker correctly argue that the potential for arbitrary overinclusion still exists. After all, no human-judgment-driven
system is perfect. Nevertheless, to prove that this potential is being
realized to the same extent as in the pre-Furman era, Steiker and
Steiker would have to present something more than assumption and
conjecture. This they do not do, cryptically citing only one source in
one footnote175 for the general proposition that “a substantial number of death sentences continue to be imposed in a fashion that can
only be described as ‘freakish.’ ”176 Perhaps even worse than their
lack of proof is their failure to address significant research that
tends to prove exactly the opposite conclusion, not only as to overin-

172. See BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 33, at 182 (“The most striking postFurman change has been the statewide decline in the race-of-defendant effect. Indeed, on
average, black defendants appear to enjoy a slight overall advantage compared to white
defendants, although the effect is not statistically significant.”)
173. See id. at 183-84. Instead, BWP attribute the finding to a general trend toward
equal treatment of African-American defendants that began in urban areas and spread to
rural areas. See id. Thus, they state, “Consequently, it does not appear that the decline in
discrimination based on the defendant’s race is attributable to Georgia’s 1973 statutory
changes.” Id. at 184.
174. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
175. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 1, at 358 n.8.
176. Id. (quoting PATERNOSTER, supra note 1, at xv).
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FIGURE 3
A. Case Culpability Level
from 1 (low) to 6 (high)

B. Death-Sentence Rate

1

.01 (1/110)

2

.08 (8/95)

3

.23 (10/43)

4

.53 (8/15)

5

.35 (7/20)

6

1.00 (10/10)

clusion (a concern the Court embraces) but also as to underinclusion
(a concern the Court embraces only in part).
1. Empirical Evidence of the Decline in Overinclusion
a. BWP’s Georgia Study
When it comes to empirical analysis of the real-world effects of a
death penalty system, the work of BWP in Georgia 177 towers above
all others, and is the only substantial research effort that has compared a pre-Furman system with a post-Furman system.178 BWP
meticulously analyzed 131 pre- and post-Furman Georgia homicide
cases, compiled the data, and subjected it to sophisticated statistical
analysis. The BWP data, although used by BWP to measure underinclusion,179 can easily be adapted to examine overinclusion.
BWP sorted 293 death-eligible (i.e., guilty of murder) pre-Furman
cases into six culpability levels (with level one being least culpable,
and level six being most culpable) based upon numerous factors. 180
They then calculated the death sentencing rate within each level.
Their results are set forth in Figure 3. 181 The data is easy to understand: at level one, for example, only one out of 110 defendants was

177. See supra note 35.
178. See BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 33, at 229-48 (discussing three
studies of pre-Furman cases, and three studies of post-Furman cases). An interesting recent research effort is reported in Robert E. Weiss et al., Assessing the Capriciousness of
Death Penalty Charging, 30 L. & SOC’Y REV. 607, 617-25 (1996) (analyzing death penalty
charging in 363 homicides in San Francisco County, California, through regression analysis and concluding that under the most optimistic assessment, the charging system
“wring[s] out about two-thirds of the potential capriciousness”).
179. See BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 33, at 80-81 (“The purpose of each
analysis was to determine whether those defendants who received sentences of death can be
meaningfully distinguished from the many other defendants who received only life sentences.”).
180. See id. at 44 (over 150 aggravating and mitigating factors were used).
181. See id. at 85.
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FIGURE 4
A. Case Culpability Level
from 1 (low) to 6 (high)

B. Death-Sentence Rate
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sentenced to death, a rate of .01; while at level six, ten out of ten defendants were sentenced to death, a rate of 1.00.
The chart clearly illustrates some overinclusion, although exactly
how much depends upon what cutoff one establishes for the dividing
line between overinclusion and underinclusion. To me, the .23 rate
at level three does not illustrate overinclusion—almost a quarter of
the murderers in that level were determined unanimously by juries
to be among the “worst” murderers. On the other hand, any defendant in a level where the death sentencing rate falls below .10 (ten
percent) has figuratively been “struck by lightning.” 182 The data in
this chart does not require any thinner parsing: using the .10 cutoff,
the proportion of overincluded defendants to the whole 293-person
population is .03 (9/293). This rate is quite low in and of itself. 183 However, the proportion of overinclusive death sentences within the category of the death-sentenced is significant—nine of the forty-four death
sentences were overinclusive, a proportion of .20 (twenty percent).
BWP performed the same analysis on 606 Georgia murder convictions in the five years following the 1973 enactment of the new
Georgia death penalty statute prompted by Furman. The lack of any
182. Furman, 408 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
183. In light of this statistic, it is possible to argue that the Court overreacted in Furman. However, there are important aspects of the world as seen by the Court in 1972 that
are not reflected by this statistic. First, this statistic does not include cases that came before the Court from Georgia in which the defendants had been sentenced to death for rape
or armed robbery, two crimes as to which the Court later determined that the death penalty was overinclusive as a matter of law. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977);
Hooks v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 917, 917 (1977). Second, it took quite a lot of legwork for the
Baldus group to dig out the information that enabled them to determine just how aggravated each case was. The lack of a meaningful sentencing proceeding in Georgia prior to
1972 means that the Court did not have access to this information—the Georgia system
from the Court’s perspective must have resembled a “black box” from which defendants’
names were pulled seemingly at random. Third, this statistic does not reflect the seemingly disproportionate number of African-Americans sentenced to death, particularly for
rapes of white women. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
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aggravating circumstance removed 123 defendants from death penalty eligibility,184 which left 483 eligible cases. The BWP figures for
those cases are shown in Figure 4.185 Here, more discrimination concerning where to draw the cutoff for overinclusion is appropriate.
Specifically, were the death-sentenced defendants at level two,
where the rate is .14, overincluded? If we adopt a .10 cutoff, thereby
deeming level two’s death-sentenced defendants to not have been
overincluded, then there is a significant improvement from the preFurman data: only six of the 606 defendants (remember, the 123 defendants who were convicted of first-degree murder but were not
death-eligible because of the lack of an aggravating circumstance
have to be included to make a valid comparison, because they would
have been death-eligible pre-Furman) were overincluded, a proportion of .001 (compared to the pre-Furman proportion of .03); and
only six of the 112 death sentences were overinclusive, a proportion
of .05 (compared to the pre-Furman proportion of .20). If we draw
the cutoff higher, say at .15 (which would be reasonable), or .20
(which would be too high, but nevertheless would make no difference
with these data, because the .14 rate at level two jumps to .38 at
level three), the improvement still exists, although it becomes less
significant. There also are fifteen defendants out of the 606-person
population who were overincluded, a proportion of .025. While that
improvement may be a modest one compared with the pre-Furman
proportion of .03, such modesty could be because there really was
not a great deal of improvement that could be made—the threepercent pre-Furman overinclusion rate may be about as close to
“perfect” operation as any human-judgment-driven system is likely
to get.186 However, another comparison shows more significant improvement in the post-Furman era—the overincluded defendants as
a proportion of the death-sentenced defendants is .13 (fifteen of 112),
rather than the pre-Furman .20 rate.
Whether these pre-Furman to post-Furman improvements exist
in states other than Georgia has not been systematically studied.
Nor has Georgia data since 1978 been examined. 187 However, the
BWP study does provide important evidence to counter Steiker and
Steiker’s conclusion in one of the most active death penalty states
during a critical time period. The BWP evidence also seems to provide the basis for surmising that the same improvements may well
have occurred in other death penalty states, and for other time periods up to the present.
184. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 33, at 88-89.
185. See id. at 92.
186. I realize, of course, that death penalty opponents often contend that the very fact
that the system cannot be made perfect is a cogent argument for its abolition.
187. This has prompted me to make a modest effort to do so. See infra Part III.B.1.b.
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b. Some New Evidence That Overinclusion Is Not a Widespread
Defect in Georgia’s System
To determine whether BWP’s findings about the decrease in
overinclusion in Georgia were an artifact of the 1970s, I analyzed
more recent cases in Georgia in which defendants received death
sentences. I chose the twenty-five cases most recently decided by the
Georgia Supreme Court on direct appeal. 188 This sample includes
almost one-quarter of the inmates on Georgia’s death row, 189 and
covers Georgia Supreme Court opinions from early 1988 through
late 1995. Although this research is based upon court opinions alone
and does not approach the thoroughness of the BWP study, it is
nonetheless illuminating.
I begin with a general comment: the facts in every one of the
twenty-five cases (except one190) serve immediate notice that the case
is something more than a run-of-the-mill homicide. Six recurring exacerbating motifs (hereinafter “exacerbators”) are apparent. By far
the most commonly occurring (fifteen cases) is what I will call
“overkill”: the method of killing is particularly repulsive because the
defendant inflicted more damage than was necessary to cause death.
Four cases involve more than fifteen stab wounds; 191 three involve
multiple gunshot wounds inflicted in other than a continuous
burst;192 two involve repeated bludgeoning;193 one involves both liga-

188. These cases are summarized in Appendix B. I identified these cases by obtaining a
printout of all of the inmates on Georgia’s death row from the NAACP Legal Defense Fund
Death Penalty Project. I arranged the cases in reverse chronological order from date of
sentence, then I searched the defendants’ names electronically, to find a direct appeal decision by the Georgia Supreme Court. I excluded two of these cases. First, I did not use
Drane v. State, 455 S.E.2d 27 (Ga. 1995), because the Georgia Supreme Court found that
the trial court may have improperly excluded the co-defendant’s confession—in which the
co-defendant took major responsibility for the killing—and reversed the conviction. See id.
at 30. Although this evidence was admitted at the sentencing phase, the failure to admit it
at the guilt phase could have undermined the validity of the jury’s verdict at the guilt
phase. The second case I excluded was Potts v. State, 410 S.E.2d 89 (Ga. 1991). This case
involved a kidnapping and murder that occurred in 1981, but took almost a decade to
reach the Georgia Supreme Court. I excluded this case because the crime was not committed during the same time frame as the other cases I examined. I replaced these two cases
with the next two cases in reverse chronological order.
189. The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund’s Spring 1995 “Death Row
U.S.A.” Report shows 104 inmates under a sentence of death in Georgia.
190. See infra notes 237-39 and accompanying text.
191. See Ledford v. State, 439 S.E.2d 917 (Ga. 1994); Bennett v. State, 414 S.E.2d 218
(Ga. 1992); Gibson v. State, 404 S.E.2d 781 (Ga. 1991); Hall v. State, 383 S.E.2d 128 (Ga.
1989); see also Appendix B, nos. 6, 13, 17, 23.
192. See Davis v. State, 426 S.E.2d 844 (Ga. 1993); Tharpe v. State, 416 S.E.2d 78 (Ga.
1992); Lynd v. State, 414 S.E.2d 5 (Ga. 1992); see also Appendix B, nos. 10, 12, 14.
193. See Hill v. State, 427 S.E.2d 770 (Ga. 1993); Todd v. State, 410 S.E.2d 725 (Ga.
1991); see also Appendix B, nos. 9, 16.
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ture and manual strangulation;194 and four involve a potpourri of
methods: (1) shooting, bludgeoning with a paint can, and beating
with a crowbar;195 (2) beating with a baseball bat, shooting, and dismembering (although the victim may have been dead at the time of
dismembering);196 (3) stabbing over a hundred times and then bludgeoning in the head with a hammer;197 and (4) stabbing and then
beating in the head with a clothing iron. 198
After overkill, the second exacerbator is kidnap/rape/murder (four
cases).199 The third is multiple homicide (six cases). 200 The fourth is
that the defendant’s prior criminal record clearly indicated that he
had not learned his lesson (three cases): (1) the defendant was out
on parole from a sentence for a prior murder; 201 (2) the defendant
committed the homicide while in prison for a capital crime; 202 and (3)
the defendant committed the kidnap/rape/murder on the same day
he was released on parole.203 The fifth exacerbator is that defendant
was on a crime spree in which he committed serious crimes other
than the homicide that resulted in the death sentence (seven cases):
(1) the defendant was involved in a series of motel-patron robberies,
and had shot a person in another robbery; 204 (2) the defendant had
shot a person two hours earlier and was pistol-whipping another
person when interrupted by the murder victim; 205 (3) the defendant
planned and executed a series of rapes;206 (4) after killing the victim,
the defendant drove to another state and killed again; 207 (5) after
bludgeoning the victim with a hammer and stealing his car and
some personal belongings, defendant drove to another state where
he robbed, bludgeoned, and shot another person; 208 (6) defendant
194. See Wellons v. State, 463 S.E.2d 868 (Ga. 1995), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 97 (1996);
see also Appendix B, no. 1.
195. See Crowe v. State, 458 S.E.2d 799 (Ga. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1021
(1996); see also Appendix B, no. 3.
196. See Hittson v. State, 449 S.E.2d 586 (Ga. 1994); see also Appendix B, no. 5.
197. See Bennett v. State, 149 S.E.2d 218 (Ga. 1992); see also Appendix B, no. 13.
198. See Jarrells v. State, 375 S.E.2d 842 (Ga. 1989); see also Appendix B, no. 25.
199. See Wellons v. State, 463 S.E.2d 868 (Ga. 1995), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 97 (1996);
Ward v. State, 417 S.E.2d 130 (Ga. 1992); Tharpe v. State, 416 S.E.2d 78 (Ga. 1992); Pitts
v. State, 386 S.E.2d 351 (Ga. 1989); see also Appendix B, nos. 1, 11, 12, 21.
200. See McMichen v. State, 458 S.E.2d 833 (Ga. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 819
(1996); Osborne v. State, 430 S.E.2d 576 (Ga. 1993); Ferrell v. State, 401 S.E.2d 741 (Ga.
1991); Stripling v. State, 401 S.E.2d 500 (Ga. 1991); Hightower v. State, 386 S.E.2d 509
(Ga. 1989); Hatcher v. State, 379 S.E.2d 775 (Ga. 1989); see also Appendix B, nos. 2, 8, 19,
20, 22, 24.
201. See Burgess v. State, 450 S.E.2d 680 (Ga. 1994); see also Appendix B, no. 4.
202. See Hill v. State, 427 S.E.2d 770 (Ga. 1993); see also Appendix B, no. 9.
203. See Pitts v. State, 386 S.E.2d 351 (Ga. 1989); see also Appendix B, no. 21.
204. See Burgess v. State, 450 S.E.2d 680 (Ga. 1994); see also Appendix B, no. 4.
205. See Davis v. State, 426 S.E.2d 844 (Ga. 1993); see also Appendix B, no. 10.
206. See Ward v. State, 417 S.E.2d 130 (Ga. 1992); see also Appendix B, no. 11.
207. See Lynd v. State, 414 S.E.2d 5 (Ga. 1992); see also Appendix B, no. 14.
208. See Todd v. State, 410 S.E.2d 725 (Ga. 1991); see also Appendix B, no. 16.
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shot two other people during a robbery in addition to the two who
died;209 and (7) defendant tied up, robbed, and seriously battered another victim in addition to the one who died. 210 The sixth exacerbator
is that the defendant killed a child (two cases). 211 There is only one212
of the twenty-five cases that does not contain at least one of these
exacerbating motifs, and many cases involve more than one, as is
shown in the chart below.213
The exacerbators are, of course, only a rough-and-ready indicator
that these death sentences were not overinclusive. A more illuminating test would be to try to estimate what percentage of similar cases
resulted in death sentences. I analyzed the cases in two ways. First,
I applied the Barnett method, which has already been explained. 214
Second, I used a method developed by BWP 215 that categorizes cases
based upon the following factors: the number of persons killed by defendant;216 whether the defendant committed a serious contemporaneous offense (kidnapping, rape, or armed robbery); 217 whether there
were serious aggravating circumstances;218 whether defendant had a
prior record;219 whether there were mitigating circumstances; 220 and
whether there were minor aggravating circumstances. 221 The BWP
method is contained in Appendices C and D. The two methods are
complementary in that each considers significant factors that the
other does not, or uses the factors differently in the analysis. Thus,

209. See Stripling v. State, 401 S.E.2d 500 (Ga. 1991); see also Appendix B, no. 20.
210. See Jarrells v. State, 375 S.E.2d 842 (Ga. 1989); see also Appendix B, no. 25.
211. See Wellons v. State, 463 S.E.2d 868 (Ga. 1995); Hall v. State, 415 S.E.2d 158 (Ga.
1991); see also Appendix B, nos. 1, 15.
212. See Fugate v. State, 431 S.E.2d 104 (Ga. 1993); see also Appendix B, no. 7.
213. See infra p. 587.
214. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text; see also Appendix A.
215. See Baldus et al., Comparative Review, supra note 32, at 684-86.
216. See id. at 685.
217. See id.
218. See id. at 686 n.90.
The major aggravating factors were: Torture, excessive and unnecessary
pain, victim bound and/or gagged, execution-style killing, sexual perversion
other than rape, victim pled for life, defendant showed pleasure with killing,
mutilation, slashed throat, defendant an escapee, victim was a police or fire person, multiple shots to head or multiple stab wounds, insurance motive, or victim
was held hostage.
Id.
219. See id. at 686.
220. See id. at 686 n.91.
The mitigating factors were: Defendant showed remorse, gave self up within 24
hours, was drunk or had a history of drug or alcohol abuse, had no intent to kill,
believed he or she had a moral justification, the victim was a fugitive, provoked or
aroused defendant, was drinking, or using drugs or had bad blood with defendant.
Id.
221. See id. at 686 n.92 (“The minor aggravating factors were: A race-related motive,
victim was drowned, defendant resisted arrest, defendant created a great risk in a public
place, or the victim was a hostage or female.”).
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it would not be unusual for cases to end up in boxes in the respective
charts that had significantly different death-sentencing ratios. I
considered a case worthy of further discussion in terms of overinclusion if its ratio did not rise to the level of .30 using either method;
i.e., less than thirty percent of defendants in the boxes in which the
defendant’s case fell in the respective charts were sentenced to
death. In using these two methods, I made the large but commonsensical assumption that the factors about cases which were significant in the 1970s remained constant in the late 1980s and early
1990s.222 The results of my analyses appear in summary form in
Figure 5.
There are four cases—all involving intrafamily killings—that require closer examination for overinclusion because they do not rise
to the .30 ratio under either the Barnett or BWP criteria: cases 7,
13, 15, and 18. I will examine these cases in order from the easiest
to the hardest to understand why a death sentence was imposed.
Case 15 is the lowest scoring of all the cases—garnering only a
.01 ratio in the Barnett analysis, and a .00 under the BWP analysis—yet it is the easiest one to understand why a death sentence
was imposed. What the case really shows are the limitations of both
the Barnett and BWP analyses. In this case, the defendant’s tenyear-old son annoyed him by playing with a toy tractor after the defendant asked him to stop.223 Defendant found his shotgun (which
the family had hidden), and shot the boy while the child begged for
his life.224 Defendant then stated, “I couldn’t learn him nothing by
beating him with a belt, so I guess I learned him something this
time.”225 The defendant was, though, quite drunk at the time. 226 The
222. Specifically, I assumed that the factors included within the Barnett analysis and
the BWP analysis continue to identify the basic aggravating and mitigating factors, and
continue to directly reflect their relative strength. As BWP explain:
There are two basic approaches to classifying cases as similar or dissimilar—
the a priori and the empirical. The a priori approach endeavors to classify cases
as similar on the basis of criteria that, from a legal or moral perspective, one
believes should govern the appropriate sentence.
....
The empirical approach also begins by presupposing that certain factual
characteristics of the case being reviewed can serve to identify other cases of
“similar” culpability. In contrast to the a priori approach—which primarily selects those factual characteristics on a normative basis—the empirical approach tries to employ those legitimate case characteristics that, statistically,
best explain the observed sentencing results . . . . The difference between the
two methods is that the a priorist selects the factors he or she believes should
influence the sentencing decision, while the empiricist selects the factors that
actually appear to do so.
BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 33, at 47-48. Thus, I am adopting an a priori
approach, with my a priori choices being informed by the results of empirical studies.
223. See Hall v. State, 415 S.E.2d 158, 159 (Ga. 1991).
224. See id. at 160.
225. Id.
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case scores only 1, 0, 1 under the Barnett criteria because, as to the
first Barnett factor, the case does not meet any of the criteria for
raising the presumptive 1 to a 2; as to the second factor, the defendant knew the victim, resulting in a score of 0; and as to the third
factor, while there was no claim of self-defense, thus giving a score
of 1, the case does not meet any of the criteria for the vileness subinquiry concerning the horrific nature of the killing that would raise
the 1 to a 2. The case scores low under the BWP criteria because the
only factor

226. See id.
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FIGURE 5
CASE #

BARNETT RATIO

BWP RATIO

EXACERBATORS

1

.28

.68

Overkill; kidnap/rape; child
victim

2

.56

.32

Double homicide

3

.81

.60

Overkill

4

—227

.25

Prior record; spree

5

.56

.03

Overkill

6

.28

.60

Overkill

7

.01

.00?228

—

8

.28

.32

Double homicide

9

.56

—229

Overkill

10

.81

.69

Overkill; spree

11

.86

.69

Kidnap/rape; spree

12

.28

.89

Overkill

13

.28

.03

Overkill

14

.56

.69

Overkill: spree

15

.01

.00

Child victim

16

.28

.60

Overkill; spree

17

.81

.60

Overkill

18

.05

.03

Overkill

19

.28

.88

Double homicide

20

.30

.88

Double homicide; spree

21

.81

.25

Kidnap/rape; prior record

22

.28

.32

Triple homicide; 2 child (?)
victims

23

.56

.42

Overkill

24

.28

.32

Double homicide

25

.81

.69

Overkill; spree

227. Barnett reported no cases in this box, but this is clearly a box that should have a
high ratio—the ratios in the other boxes where the three Barnett integers totaled “4” are
.56 and .81.
228. In this case, the defendant pulled the victim’s head back by the hair and shot her
in the forehead. If this is not an “execution-style” killing (BWP do not define this), then
there is no serious aggravating circumstance, and the case scores .00 on the BWP scale. If
it is an execution-style killing, then it scores .42.
229. There were not enough cases in this box in the BWP study (only one, in which a
death sentence was not imposed) to form a valid proportion. The boxes on either side had
moderate ratios (.40 and .50), but were based upon a small number of cases.
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working against the defendant is a serious aggravating circumstance
(victim pled for life). The case did not involve a serious contemporaneous felony, the defendant had no prior record, the defendant presented the mitigator of drunkenness, and there was no minor aggravating circumstance. Neither analysis captures the significance of
the victim being a child, the trivialness of the “provocation,” or the
defendant’s subsequent boasting about the homicide. Common sense
indicates that this is actually quite an aggravated case, and that
many—if not most—juries would impose death sentences in similar
cases.
The death sentence in case 13 is the next easiest to understand.
In this case, the defendant stabbed his sleeping wife over a hundred
times, then bludgeoned her in the head with a hammer. 230 His defense was that he was laboring under the delusion that his wife and
another man were plotting to kill him,231 but the opinion presents no
evidence that defendant had a history of mental problems. Clearly,
overkill explains this death sentence. The Barnett ratio of .28 does
not raise a real problem here—while that ratio is certainly only
moderate, box M, into which this case falls, is a popular one. It contains the third highest number of cases of any of the Barnett’s boxes,
and accounts for eleven death sentences in the cases Barnett studied. As to the BWP criteria, the case scored a dismal .03 because it
did not involve a serious contemporaneous offense, the defendant
had no prior record, and the defendant presented a mitigating circumstance of believing he had a moral justification. The explanation
for this death sentence may be that the sentencers in the actual
cases may not have taken into account the defendants’ mitigating
circumstances. It is notoriously difficult to convince sentencers that
evidence of mental problems is strong enough to operate as a mitigating factor.232 It is very likely that the sentencer here rejected the
mitigating evidence, which would mean that the case actually falls
into BWP box B12, where the ratio is .42. Or perhaps this case simply shows the limits of both the Barnett and BWP modes of analysis
to capture the nuances of every case—the overkill here seems commonsensically to lead to the conclusion that the case is not overincluded.
Case 18 is almost a carbon copy of case 13, with one important
exception. In case 18, on the day defendant’s wife obtained a good230. See Bennett v. Georgia, 414 S.E.2d 218, 220 (Ga. 1992).
231. See id.
232. See David Cook et al., The Decisionmakers: What Moves Prosecutors, Judges, &
Jurors? (Mar. 4, 1996) (finding that jurors are more willing to find mental problems mitigating in the abstract than when applied to a real case) (materials based upon the Capital
Jury Research project presented at Life in the Balance VIII conference in St. Louis, Missouri) (on file with the author).
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behavior warrant, defendant (with his wife’s agreement) went to
their apartment to gather some belongings.233 While there he
stabbed his wife numerous times, including a neck slash that almost
decapitated her.234 The one important difference from case 13 is that
here the defendant had a documented history of psychological and
substance abuse problems.235 As in case 13, the death sentence is
certainly a result of the defendant’s overkill. Case 18 scores lower
than case 13 using the Barnett analysis because the defendant’s
documented mental health problems lower the score on the first factor from 1 to 0. The case scores the same as case 13 under BWP criteria for the same reasons: no serious contemporary offense, no prior
record, and a mitigating circumstance. The most likely explanation
that would save this sentence from being classified as overinclusive
is the same as in case 13: the sentencer was not convinced by the
mental health testimony. Indeed, the opinion points out that the
prosecutor presented opposing experts to testify that the defendant
was a malingerer.236 If the jury believed that testimony, the case
would fall into another box with a ratio of .42.
The hardest case in which to explain the death sentence as not
overinclusive is number 7. In this case, the defendant broke into his
ex-wife’s house armed with a gun.237 When she and her son arrived
home, the son tried to shoot the defendant, but the gun wouldn’t
fire.238 Defendant hit his ex-wife at least fifty times, then dragged
her outside, pulled her head back by her hair, and shot her in the
forehead.239 This case is the only one of the twenty-five that does not
involve an exacerbator. Further, the case’s Barnett score of 1, 0, 1
places it in a category where only one of 106 cases resulted in a
death sentence. Under BWP analysis, it falls into a box where the
ratio is .00 (unless this qualifies as an “execution-style” killing, in
which case it moves to a box with a .42 ratio). What all this shows is
that despite the appalling nature of the case, it is a fairly typical
domestic killing. The other twenty-four cases demonstrate that
death sentences are not imposed in domestic killings unless there
are multiple homicides (as in cases 2, 22, and 24), overkill (as in
cases 12, 13, 14, 18 and 23), or a child victim (as in case 15). None of
these factors are present here. Although the case does involve an
armed burglary, and an arguably cold, execution-style slaying, it
may represent an instance of overinclusion.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

See Taylor v. Georgia, 404 S.E.2d 255, 257 (Ga. 1991).
See id.
See id.
See id. at 258.
See Fugate v. Georgia, 431 S.E.2d 104, 106-07 (Ga. 1993).
See id. at 107.
See id.
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My conclusion from analyzing these cases is that, with one possible exception,240 the Georgia system has not been overinclusive
over the past six years. This conclusion accords with the very low
rate of overinclusion illustrated by the BWP study of 1973-1978. 241
Even though neither BWP nor I examined cases from 1979-1988 for
overinclusion, I feel fairly confident in asserting that Georgia’s postFurman system has not exhibited a significant degree of overinclusion. Whether the same can be said for other states is an open question, but perhaps the Georgia data provides hope that what is true
in Georgia is also true elsewhere.
2. Empirical Evidence of the Decline in Underinclusion
BWP specifically set out to compare underinclusion in the preand post-Furman cases.242 Their standard for judging underinclusion
was the following: “[W]e classify death sentences as presumptively
excessive [the BWP synonym for underinclusive] if the frequency
with which death sentences occur in other cases classified as
‘similar’ by our various measures is less than .35. If the deathsentencing rate among similar cases exceeds .80, we classify a
death-sentence case as presumptively evenhanded.” 243 Using an
“overall culpability” index based upon seventeen legitimate case
characteristics244 and regression analysis,245 BWP studied a sample
of pre- and post-Furman cases. This comparison of the two sets of
cases showed the post-Furman system to be significantly less underinclusive and more evenhanded than the pre-Furman system:
240. See supra notes 237-39 and accompanying text.
241. See supra pp. 581-82.
242. See BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 33, at 42.
243. Id. at 60.
244. See id. at 90-91 (“Specifically, our ‘overall culpability’ index ranks the cases according to the presence or absence of seventeen legitimate case characteristics and combinations thereof that share a statistically significant relationship with the sentences imposed.”).
245. See id. at 56.
We developed a regression-based culpability index for the [study] with a logistic multiple-regression analysis designed to identify statistically the factors
that best explain which defendants received death sentences . . . . This procedure required us, first, to collect information for every case concerning a large
number of legitimate case characteristics, such as prior record or a contemporaneous felony, that might have influenced the sentencing decision. We then
computed for each such case characteristic a regression co-efficient (or ‘weight’)
that reflected its individual contribution to the overall culpability index. Next,
we calculated the relative culpability or blameworthiness of each case by
summing the ‘weights’ of all the legitimate explanatory variables present in
that case. We then ranked all the cases according to their relative culpability
scores, thereby constructing an overall culpability index along which the cases
were distributed. Finally, we defined as ‘similar’ six groups of cases with comparable overall culpability scores.
Id.
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[I]n comparison to [the pre-Furman figure], there is more selectivity in the post-Furman system. For example, only 29 percent of the
post-Furman death-sentence cases possessed culpability scores
equal to or less than the culpability score of the 95th percentile
life-sentence cases, a decline from the comparable pre-Furman figure of 61 percent . . . . Only 13 percent of the post-Furman death
sentences appear in categories of cases with death-sentencing
rates of less than .35, and more than half . . . of the post-Furman
death sentences occurred in cases for which the death-sentencing
rate among similar cases exceeds .80.
The resulting proportion of presumptively excessive sentences
has dropped from .43 (19/44) pre-Furman to .13 (15/112) postFurman, and the proportion of [presumptively] evenhanded sentences has grown from .23 (10/44) pre-Furman to .51 (57/112) postFurman. This is evidence of increased selectivity.246

One also should note from the two BWP charts above 247 that the
death-sentencing rate rose in the three crucial midlevel categories
that give rise to the underinclusion concern—from .23 to .38 in level
three; from .53 to .65 in level four; and from .35 to .85 in level five—
indeed, the level five proportion moved from the brink of presumptive excessiveness to above the threshold for presumptive evenhandedness. Steiker and Steiker fail to acknowledge the existence of this
evidence; indeed, they cite the very BWP book in which this data
appears for the proposition that “critics” argue that the Court has
“turned its back on regulating the death penalty and no longer even
attempts to meet the concerns about arbitrary . . . imposition of
death that animated its ‘constitutionalization’ of capital punishment
in Furman.”248
Whether we should be heartened by this decline in underinclusion is another question. A decline in merits-based underinclusion
would be a mixed blessing: while it would make the system more
evenhanded, it also would tend to show that the system is not erring
as much as it perhaps should on the side of not imposing death in
debatable cases. A decline in mundane underinclusion would be
neutral. A decline in invidious underinclusion would be welcome,
but there is no significant evidence of such a decline due to anything
the Court has done.
C. Are the Post-Furman Declines in Overinclusion and
Underinclusion Attributable to the Court’s Jurisprudence?
A last hope for Steiker and Steiker’s conclusion might be that,
even assuming these improvements in overinclusion and underin246. Id. at 91-92.
247. See supra pp. 580-81.
248. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 1, at 358.
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clusion exist, they were not a result of the Court’s death penalty
regulatory jurisprudence, but instead resulted from some other factor(s). Unfortunately for Steiker and Steiker, BWP considered this
possibility, and rejected the conclusion that the Court’s efforts had
not played a significant role in the process.249
BWP noted that improvements in the system began immediately
and abruptly after the Georgia Legislature retooled the death penalty statutes in the wake of Furman:
The information . . . suggests that Georgia’s 1973 statutory reforms caused the observed differences in Georgia’s pre- and postFurman capital-sentencing patterns. The data for 1974, the first
post-Furman year with a large number of death sentences, indicate a considerably greater degree of selectivity compared to the
pre-Furman period. The trend lines . . . which indicate the yearly
median-culpability scores for life- and death-sentence cases, also
suggest that the impact of the post-Furman procedural changes
was, except in 1976, a sustained one. The data . . . which presents
the average rather than the median culpability scores for the lifeand death-sentence cases from 1970 to 1978, suggest an even
greater increase in selectivity post-Furman.250

BWP hypothesized four changes other than the statutory reforms
prompted by Furman that might have accounted for the improvements. These include better record-keeping in the state system; 251 a
general trend toward consistency and reasonableness on the parts of
prosecutors and juries, perhaps from better education and improved
living standards;252 initially greater selectivity by prosecutors and
judges due to the fear that the Court would exercise close supervision over the new system;253 and a general decline in racial discrimination.254 While believing that each of these alternative hypotheses
probably had some explanatory power,255 BWP concluded that the
impact of the statutory reforms was nonetheless important: “We remain persuaded, therefore, that Georgia’s 1973 statutory reforms
contributed significantly to the decline of excessiveness that we observe in our post-Furman data.”256 Those statutory reforms were, of
course, a direct product of the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence.
This hardly supports Steiker and Steiker’s conclusion that the
Court’s efforts—judged through the lens of its own concerns—have
been an ineffective disaster in Georgia. The Georgia data gives rea249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

See BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 33, at 98-105.
Id. at 100.
See id. at 98-100.
See id. at 105.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
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son to suspect that the same ameliorative effect has occurred in
other states.
IV. CONCLUSION
Steiker and Steiker begin the second paragraph of their article
with the observation, “Virtually no one thinks that the constitutional regulation of capital punishment has been a success.” 257 If the
authors had said “complete success,” surely no one, including the
Supreme Court justices, would disagree. But the Court would not—
and should not—agree that its efforts have been an ineffective disaster. The best available evidence shows that the Court’s regulatory
death penalty jurisprudence has been successful in decreasing
overinclusion, which is the primary vice that the Court has seen in
death penalty systems for the last quarter of a century. One can argue that the Court was wrong to focus (or focus so exclusively) on
minimizing overinclusion, or that the Court could have devised better ways to achieve that goal.258 But let’s give credit where credit is
due—the populations of death rows since 1972 very likely comprise a
more carefully selected and “worse” collection of malefactors than before 1972. This is not an insignificant achievement. So, while death
penalty opponents rue the Court’s failure to regulate death more severely, I doubt that there is one experienced capital defense lawyer
in this country who would rather return to the pre-Furman era.
Perhaps not even many prosecutors would want to return to the days
before Furman, when such an unguided power of life and death
rested in their hands.

257. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 1, at 357.
258. To me, the most regrettable road not taken by the Court has been its failure to require a heightened level of attorney competence above the relatively minimal standard set
for all cases, including death penalty cases, in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984) (requiring that counsel’s performance be shown to be deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense in order to reverse a conviction or death sentence). A requirement that states provide super-competent trial counsel would either force states out
of the death penalty business due to excessive costs or force states to provide top-notch
counsel. Either possibility would be more fair to defendants and more efficient in the long
run.

596

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:545

APPENDIX A259
CLASSIFICATION RULES
I. THE CERTAINTY THE DEFENDANT IS A DELIBERATE KILLER
Score the case either 0, 1, 2 on this dimension, applying the following criteria:
(i) The case is rated 0 if any of the following circumstances pertain:
(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)
(7)

The narrative indicates the evidence in the case seemed weak
(e.g., “case based solely on circumstantial evidence”).
The narrative mentions evidence that worked against the view
that the defendant was guilty (e.g., tests for residue on the defendant’s hand from firing a gun were negative).
It seems clear that the defendant neither ordered the killing nor
was the trigger man. (Note that (3) differs from the weaker statement that it is uncertain whether the defendant was the trigger
man.)
The killing has an “accidental” touch about it, because
(a)
a fairly long period (perhaps a week or more) elapsed between the incident and the victim’s death, or
(b)
the death was caused by a shot fired somewhat randomly
(e.g., through a door), or
(c)
the death was caused by a beating similar to previous
beatings of the victim by the defendant.
There is reason to doubt that the defendant’s actions in themselves
would have caused the victim’s death (e.g., (i) the defendant beat
the victim, but it was a co-perpetrator’s stabbing that killed him,
or (ii) the defendant’s beating of the victim induced a heart seizure).
The defendant was one of several participants in a conspiracy to
kill, but took no part in the actual killing.
The narrative mentions that the defendant was previously treated
for mental problems (e.g., institutionalized). Neglect references to
insanity if the defendant has no apparent medical history.

(ii) The case is rated 2 if any of the following elements were present:
(1)
(2)

(3)

The killing was a murder-for-hire, and the defendant was either
the sole instigator or the executioner.
The defendant plotted to kill the victim (e.g., a wife and her lover
arrange to murder her husband). If, however, the defendant was
one of several plotters, and clearly not the actual killer, assume (2)
is not satisfied.
The narrative mentions that the defendant was officially implicated in other killings.

259. Barnett, supra note 32, at 1364-66.
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The narrative mentions that the defendant had tried previously to
kill the victim.
The defendant announced in advance to a third party an intention
to kill the victim. (Neglect this condition in a lover’s triangle or
lover’s quarrel case, or when the third party was a co-perpetrator.)

(iii) If the killing warrants neither a 0 nor a 2, give the case a rating
of 1. If the killing satisfies conditions for both 0 and 2, also rate it 1.
Most “common” slayings, such as killings during armed robberies or
during barroom fights, would warrant this intermediate classification. Indeed, a 2 reflects unusually clear evidence of premeditation,
while a 0 reflects unusually large doubt that the defendant knowingly acted to cause the victim’s demise.
II. THE STATUS OF THE VICTIM
On this dimension, the score is either 0 or 1.
Give a score of 0 if:
(1)
(2)

(3)

(4)
(5)

The victim was a relative of the defendant (even his or her child).
The victim was a friend of the defendant. (Interpret the word
“friend” loosely; if, for example, two people of similar age are riding together voluntarily in a car, consider them friends. However,
the mere fact that two people know each other is not sufficient.
Neighbors of vastly different ages, or the bank teller and the depositor, are not assumed friends barring other evidence of social
ties.)
The victim was an enemy of the defendant, though not the defendant’s employer. (Interpret the word “enemy” loosely; if, for instance, the victim and defendant vied for the affections of the same
woman, if the victim had harassed one of the defendant’s loved
ones, if there was a feud of some sort that turned violent, assume
enmity existed. If, however, the victim could be viewed as the defendant’s employer — whether as (say) his supervisor in a factory
or the person who hired him to perform some chores — do not give
a score of 0 under (3).)
The victim, although a stranger to the defendant, acted in a highly
provocative manner just prior to the killing (e.g., racial taunts).
The victim was engaged in an illegal or often-disapproved activity
at the time of the killing (e.g., a drug dealer, a prostitute or prostitute’s customer, owner of a homosexual bathhouse, etc.).

If the case does not warrant the rating 0, give it the score 1. 1 is
the appropriate rating for most stranger-to-stranger killings and
those in which the defendant only knew the victim in the latter’s official capacity (e.g., as employer, or attendant in a local gas station).
If there are several victims, give the case a 0 if any of those slain
qualify for it.
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III. THE HEINOUSNESS OF THE MURDER
There are two aspects to this dimension: the question whether
self-defense motivated the killing and how “gruesome” it was.
Self-defense is an element in the case under any of the following
circumstances:
(1)

The victim had at hand a deadly weapon at the time of the killing.
Merely having a gun in the store or house does not satisfy (1).
(2)
The victim was killed with his own weapon. (This is taken to imply
(1) is satisfied even if the narrative does not explicitly say so.)
NOTE: If the victim was a police officer, do not invoke self-defense in (1)
or (2) unless the officer fired shots before the defendant did.
(3)
The victim had threatened to kill the defendant or one of the defendant’s loved ones.
(4)
The victim had attacked the defendant at the time of the killing.

If none of the above conditions existed, self-defense was not a mitigating circumstance in the homicide.
NOTE: If the only evidence for self-defense is the defendant’s uncorroborated claim, assume its absence even if any of (1)(4) is alleged.
A homicide is classified as vile if one of the following circumstances is present:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)

It was accompanied by rape, or sexual abuse, either against the
victim or someone in the company of the victim.
There were at least two homicide victims.
The deceased was a kidnapping victim at the time he was slain.
Psychological torture preceded the killing (e.g., Russian roulette, a
sustained period of terror).
The victim was shot several times in the head at close range.
The killing was execution-style (i.e., victim forced to kneel or
squat, then shot in head).
The death was caused by strangulation, or arson.
The death was caused by a drowning in which physical force kept
the victim below water.
The killing involved ten (10) or more shots or stab wounds, except
when the murder weapon was a penknife or other small cutting
instrument.
The physical details of the killing are unusually repulsive (e.g., the
victim drowned in his own blood).
The body was mutilated, or otherwise grossly disfigured (except in
an attempt to conceal the homicide).
The killing was performed with a bizarre weapon (e.g., a hacksaw,
a claw hammer, an ice pick).
The defendant apparently derived pleasure from the very act of
killing. (This is distinct from his believing the victim deserved to
die, and taking pleasure on that account.)
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The crime was specifically described in the narrative as extremely
bloody.

Absent all these circumstances, the homicide is categorized as not
vile. Despite the length of the list above, most “simple” shootings,
stabbing, and beatings would not be classified as vile under these
rules.
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APPENDIX B
CASE CITATION &
DATE OF DECISION

SALIENT FACTORS

BARNETT
CRITERIA

BWP
CRITERIA

1. Wellons v. State,
463 S.E.2d 868
(Ga. 1995)
11-20-95

D kidnapped and raped 15year-old girl, then strangled
her by hand and with cord. D
had been drinking. D claimed
insanity.

1, 0, 2
.28

2. McMichen v. State,
458 S.E.2d 833
(Ga. 1995)
7-14-95

D shot and killed estranged
wife and her boyfriend after
prolonged drinking and arguing, then walked his 5-yearold daughter past the bodies
and left her in a truck within
view of scene. D showed immediate remorse. D had history of depression

2, 0, 2
.56

C1
.32

3. Crowe v. State,
458 S.E.2d 799
(Ga. 1995)
6-26-95

During armed robbery, D shot
victim in back, then bludgeoned with paint can and
crowbar before victim died.

1, 1, 2
.81

B27
.60

4. Burgess v. State,
450 S.E.2d 680
(Ga. 1994)
12-5-94

During armed robbery, D shot
victim who failed to obey order
to remove hands from pockets.
Several days earlier D had
shot another person in another armed robbery. D involved in at least two other
armed robberies. D on parole
from life sentence for earlier
murder. D denied being trigger man.

2, 1, 1
(No Barnett
cases to form
ratio, but ratios
in other categories where
three digits total to 4 are .81
and .56)

B24
.25

5. Hittson v. State,
449 S.E.2d 586
(Ga. 1994)
10-31-94

D, at behest of cohort, hit
dozing victim over head several times with ball bat, then
shot victim in head. Body was
dismembered —whether victim was still alive at time unascertainable by coroner. D
had been drinking. D claimed
insanity.

2, 0, 2
.56

B9
.03

6. Ledford v. State,
439 S.E.2d 917
(Ga. 1994)
2-21-94

D slashed throat of elderly,
rather feeble victim, almost
decapitating him; also inflicted other knife wounds. D
then broke into victim’s house,
threatened and tied up victim’s wife, took money and
victim’s truck. D claimed selfdefense.

1, 0, 2
.28

B27
.60

B26
.68
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SALIENT FACTORS

BARNETT
CRITERIA

BWP
CRITERIA

7. Fugate v. State,
431 S.E.2d 104
(Ga. 1993)
6-21-93

D broke into ex-wife’s house,
struck her at least 50 times,
dragged her outside, grabbed
her hair, pulled her head back,
and shot her in the forehead.
D claimed shooting was accidental.

1, 0, 2
.28

B4
.00
or
B12
.42

8. Osborne v. State,
430 S.E.2d 576
(Ga. 1993)
6-21-93

D shot his two companions in
a car, one shot to each of their
heads.

1, 0, 2
.28

C1
.32

9. Hill v. State,
427 S.E.2d 770
(Ga. 1993)
3-15-93

D bludgeoned cellmate with a
nail-embedded board. D had
earlier been convicted of anther capital offense.

2, 0, 2
.56

B15
(insufficient
# of cases
for valid
proportion)

10. Davis v. State,
426 S.E.2d 844
(Ga. 1993)
2-26-93

D struck a man with a pistol
and was chased by a police officer. When officer ordered
halt, D shot officer, then,
while smiling, approached officer and shot him several
more times to eliminate him
as a witness.

1, 1, 2
.81

B28
.69

11. Ward v. State,
417 S.E.2d 130
(Ga. 1992)
6-11-92

D kidnapped 5-month pregnant woman from her home,
tied her up and transported
her—she died from suffocation
from wadded up paper towels
stuffed down her throat.
Months later, D kidnapped
another woman from her home
and raped her, boasting of
having killed two people and
dumping their bodies. When
arrested, D had elaborate
written plans for more attacks. D claimed lack of memory and remorse.

2, 1, 2
.86

B28
.69

12. Tharpe v. State,
416 S.E.2d 78
(Ga. 1992)
3-17-92

D threatened wife and she
took out peace warrant. As she
and her sister-in-law were
driving, they encountered D in
his vehicle. D blocked them,
got out of car with shotgun,
took sister-in-law from car and
shot her three times, then
drove wife away and raped
her.

1, 0, 2
.28

B28
.69
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SALIENT FACTORS

BARNETT
CRITERIA

BWP
CRITERIA

13. Bennett v. State,
414 S.E.2d 218
(Ga. 1992)
3-13-92

D stabbed his sleeping wife
over 100 times, then bludgeoned her with hammer. D
claimed he was suffering from
delusion that she and a third
person were plotting to kill
him and that she was acting
in self-defense.

1, 0, 2
.28

B10
.03

14. Lynd v. State,
414 S.E.2d 5
(Ga. 1992)
2-27-92

D shot his wife; when she
showed signs of life, shot her
again and put her in car
trunk. When she began
thumping around, he opened
trunk and shot her again. After burying body he drove to
another state and killed another woman.

2, 0, 2
.56

B28
.69

15. Hall v. State,
415 S.E.2d 158
(Ga. 1991)
12-3-91

D’s 10-year-old son annoyed
him with a toy. D shot son
with shotgun while the boy
pleaded for his life. D expressed immediate remorse,
but also boasted that he had
taught the boy a lesson. D had
history of terrorizing family. D
had history of alcohol abuse,
and had blood alcohol level of
.32 around time of shooting.

1, 0, 1
.01

B9
.00

16. Todd v. State,
410 S.E.2d 725
(Ga. 1991)
11-27-91

D plotted with his girlfriend to
tie D’s roommate up and steal
his car after the roommate fell
asleep. Tired of waiting for
roommate to fall asleep, D
bludgeoned him in the head
with a hammer at least 12
times, took victim’s car and
personal items, drove to another state where he hit another person in the head with
a hammer, shot him, and took
his wallet.

1, 0, 2
.28

B27
.60

17. Gibson v. State,
404 S.E.2d 781
(Ga. 1991)
6-10-91

D didn’t like storekeeper victim and decided to rob and
hurt him. D stabbed victim 39
times, including a wound in
the neck that severed his spinal cord. D claimed he had
used crack cocaine that day.

1, 1, 2
.81

B27
.60
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SALIENT FACTORS

BARNETT
CRITERIA

BWP
CRITERIA

18. Taylor v. State,
404 S.E.2d 255
(Ga. 1991)
5-10-91

D’s wife obtained a “goodbehavior warrant” against
him. Immediately thereafter,
he stabbed her numerous
times, including a neck slash
that almost decapitated her. D
had a history of psychological
and substance abuse problems.

0, 0, 2
.05

B10
.03

19. Ferrell v. State,
401 S.E.2d 741
(Ga. 1991)
3-15-91

D shot and killed his grandmother and cousin in order to
rob the grandmother.

1, 0, 2
.28

C2
.88

20. Stripling v. State,
401 S.E.2d 500
(Ga. 1991)
2-22-91

D shot four of his co-workers,
killing two of them while robbing the employer’s place of
business. He then stole a car
at gunpoint. D claimed insanity and mental retardation.

0, 1, 2
.30

C2
.88

21. Pitts v. State,
386 S.E.2d 351
(Ga. 1989)
12-5-89

On same day he was released
on parole, D kidnapped a
woman from a parking lot,
raped her, and killed her with
a blow to the head with a pipe.

1, 1, 2
.81

B24
.25

22. Hightower v.
State, 386 S.E.2d
509 (Ga. 1989)
11-30-89

D shot his wife and two stepdaughters to death (ages of
daughters not specified).

1, 0, 2
.28

C1
.32

23. Hall v. State,
383 S.E.2d 128
(Ga. 1989)
9-11-89

D vowed to kill his estranged
wife, and boasted that he
would “not get more than ten
years.” He broke into her
house and stabbed her 17
times, including a series of
wounds to her throat in a
“necklace” pattern.

2, 0, 2
.56

B12
.42

24. Hatcher v. State,
379 S.E.2d 775
(Ga. 1989)
5-25-89

D shot and killed his former
live-in lover and her mother in
the mother’s home. Defendant
had been drinking.

1, 0, 2
.28

C1
.32

25. Jarrells v. State,
375 S.E.2d 842
(Ga. 1989)
2-8-89

D robbed two sisters who were
his neighbors. He stabbed
them both, tied them up, and
beat them both on the head
with a clothing iron. They
were discovered the next day;
one was dead.

1, 1, 2
.81

B28
.69
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APPENDIX C260
DEATH SENTENCING RATES, CONTROLLING FOR (A) THE NUMBER OF
PEOPLE KILLED BY THE DEFENDANT, AND (B) WHETHER THERE
WAS A SERIOUS CONTEMPORANEOUS OFFENSE: POST-FURMAN

KEY
DEATH SENTENCE RATE
# DEATH CASES
All Decisions
Number of
People
Killed by
Defendant
Serious
Contemporaneous
Offense

.13
(12/95)
No

.09
(3/34)

None

Yes

.17
(79/471)
No

.15
(9/61)

ALL CASES

.19
(113/607)

.03
(11/324)

.54
(22/41)

One

Yes

.46
(68/147)

No

.32
(8/25)
C1

See Appendix D
for a further
breakdown of cases
where the defendant
killed one person

260. Baldus at al., Comparative Review, supra note 32, at 687.

Two or
more

Yes

.88
(14/16)
C2
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